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COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

By LT COL THOMAS B. LINDAHL



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AIR WAR COLLEGE
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COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Disclaimer iii

Abstract iv

Biographical Sketch v

Foreword vi

INTRODUCTION 1

NATION BUILDING 7

- The Low Intensity Spectrum 7
- Nation Building: The Concept 9
- Nation Building: The Policy 15
- Nation Building: The Model 18
  - Leadership 20
  - Government Building 21
  - Security Building 23
  - Economy Building 24
  - Society Building 27
- Nation Building: The Military Role 28
- Nation Building: Lessons 30

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE 33

- Nature of Revolution 33
  - Sun Tzu 35
  - Clausewitz 35
  - Mao Tse Tung 36
- Process of Revolution 40
- Terrorism 41
- Revolutionary War: Conclusions 44

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY 47

- National Strategy 47
  - National Strategy Problem 47
  - National Interests 49
  - National Objectives 51
  - Allies 53

Threat 53
Strategy Options 55
Cost 56
Limits of Power 57
Devil's Advocacy 58
Supporting Strategy 59
Mobilizing Support 59
Strategy Dissemination 59
National Strategy Lessons 60

Military Strategy 61

Military Problem 62
Link to National Strategy 64
Allies 65
Threat 66
Military Objectives 67
Vulnerabilities 68
Dislocate Enemy Strategy 69
Force Structure 72
Cohesion 74
Intelligence 74
Combat Support 76
Strategy Dissemination 77
Military Strategy Lessons 78

Air Strategy 80

Air Problem 80
Link to Military Strategy 85
Control of Air 91
Carry Fight to the Enemy 91
Maintaining the Initiative 92
Psychological Impact of Air 94
Responsive C3I 95
What Could Go Wrong? 97
Cohesion through Strategy 99
Air Strategy Lessons 101

CONCLUSIONS 102

Appendix A (Ten Tests of National Strategy) A-1

Appendix B (Ten Tests of Military Strategy) B-1

Appendix C (Ten Tests of Air Strategy) C-1

LIST OF REFERENCES 106

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: Strategy Considerations

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This document studies the problem of revolution in developing nations and outlines a policy of nation building to improve the results of our aid to these nations. It stresses linkage between continued US aid and progress in nation building. The author discusses the nature of revolutionary war and why it has been so successful in developing countries. The author discusses strategy for countering revolutionary war after it has broken out and suggests some ways to best aid our allies in revolutionary warfighting.

Keywords: low intensity conflict

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Lindahl (M.S.E.E., Air Force Institute of Technology) has been a planner at both Wing and Major Command level and has applied his understanding of strategy to the problems of high intensity European warfighting. His only exposure to low intensity conflict was as a pilot in South Viet Nam in 1969-1970. He has served in Air Training Command, Air Force Systems Command, and most recently in US Air Forces, Europe. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer's School in residence and Air Command and Staff College by seminar. Colonel Lindahl is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1986.

FOREWORD

I started this project to focus my understanding of strategy by studying low intensity conflict, an area I knew little about before coming to the Air War College. This research paper is the result of that study.

The appendices comprise the results of my research into strategy. They are not intended to apply only to revolution, but rather, are the issues that the commander and his staff must address at each of the three major strategy levels, national (political), military (joint), and air. These appendices were less a result of research than a result of organizing my thoughts and opinions from the Military Strategy and National Security Policy blocks of Air War College instruction into a format that helped me organize my thinking.

The body of the report is an application of these strategy models to the problem of counter-revolutionary war, the most challenging form of low intensity conflict. Narrowing the focus from low intensity conflict to counter-revolutionary war was necessary because the multitude of threats included in the low intensity basket made analyzing them all impractical in the time available. Some of the issues in the strategy models do not apply or are peripheral to revolution. These items, I ignored or touched only lightly.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The essence of strategy is to attack your enemy's weakness with your strength. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a good example of strategy -- of attacking weakness with strength. The US has clear leads in a preponderance of technologies. Rather than matching the Soviet Union missile for missile and warhead for warhead, the Strategic Defense Initiative research program will yield military forces and advantages the Soviet Union cannot soon match. In a grand strategy sense, we are practicing "economy of force" in current strategic systems while applying "mass" or concentrating effort on the Soviet Union's technological weaknesses.

Just as we have developed a strategy to attack the Soviet Union's weakness, numerous countries (often with Soviet backing) have found a weakness in US strategy -- our inability to counter revolutionary movements and other low intensity threats. We have focussed on strategic threats and major wars and have built an arsenal few countries would choose to fight; however, our weapons of mass destruction are ineffective against terrorism and small unit hit-and-run tactics used by revolutionary movements.

The result of our weakness is that US interests are frequently threatened and threatened in a manner we have not developed adequate doctrine for. Both the Strategic Defense Initiative and Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) do the same thing; they neutralize an enemy's firepower advantage. SDI does it with technology while LIC does it by exploiting psychology and surprise.

Exactly what is low intensity conflict? Definitions vary but JCS Pub 2 calls it conflict short of conventional forces fighting other conventional forces (42.) Even this definition has weaknesses, since in Viet Nam, conventional US forces were pitted against conventional North Vietnamese forces. Yet, most people consider Viet Nam an example of low intensity conflict. Whatever definition is selected, low intensity conflict includes terrorism, civil strife, insurgency, and revolution. No single strategy will suffice in all instances.

Why should we study low intensity conflict? Our national defense policy seems to built on the assumption that if we deter nuclear war and major conventional war, the "little wars" will take care of themselves. That assumption is naive. Low intensity conflict is the most common form of war in the nuclear age and is the form of war most likely to threaten US interests. The loss of interests and of political prestige that result from poor support to our allies is real and, as we learned in Viet

Nam, we are vulnerable. A second, and less obvious, reason is the doctrinal belief in "people's war" by communist nations. Given that belief, it is very likely that in a major war, our conventional forces in Europe, Korea, Southwest Asia, or elsewhere, will have to prosecute a major conventional war while simultaneously fighting a communist-supported guerrilla war in our rear area. Today, we are poorly prepared for this second front. A better understanding of the dynamics of low intensity conflict will help us prepare for this possibility and may lay the groundwork for a more robust counter-guerrilla force structure.

To simplify this report, we will focus on the problem of support to a friendly government under threat from revolutionary guerrilla warfare as a substitute for all low intensity conflict. This is the most important low intensity threat we face and usually triggers the most intense national debates and the largest military commitments. The distinction we will draw between revolution and insurgency is that a revolution has the backing and support of the majority of the people while an insurgency does not. This, of course, makes a revolution more difficult to combat than an insurgency.

Low intensity means low intensity from the US perspective, not necessarily (and not normally) from the perspective of the people and government that are directly

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strategies and national resolve for coping with low intensity threat remain questionable. Perhaps the most telling test of our doctrine for dealing with low intensity threat was that, in Viet Nam, absence of, and confusion over, both doctrine and strategy helped undermine political confidence in our military's ability to conduct political warfare at the low end of the threat spectrum and led to politicians developing target sets and other major portions of the military strategy (31:34-43.) Despite the frustration experienced in Viet Nam and the abundance of evidence available on the low end of the threat spectrum, we still have only piecemeal doctrine and strategy to protect US interests in low intensity conflict.

In the post WW II era, the advent of nuclear weapons prevented all-out war between nuclear powers, but the same weapons that prevented major war left low intensity warfare as the method of choice for many nations to implement policy by force. In this era of global interests, we have developed global alliances and commitments and opened the door for US global involvement. To leave a void in our strategy for this type of conflict is to accept continued erosion of our global interests.

The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the doctrinal questions learned in low intensity conflicts and to identify strategic issues facing national, military, and air strategists in future low intensity wars. If we, in

the military, can't win small wars, we may find our politicians have lost confidence in us on major defense issues.

This paper has three major sections. The first integrates a number of political lessons into a nation building policy for assisting allies. The second describes the nature of revolutionary warfare including theories from Sun Tzu to Mao. The third section addresses counter-revolutionary strategy issues -- those decisions our leaders must make if military action is necessary. The appendices explain the train of thought running through each of the strategy sections by reviewing some of the critical doctrinal questions that commanders at each level must explore before committing their forces to combat.

NATION BUILDING

THE LOW INTENSITY SPECTRUM. The first problem in studying the low end of the threat spectrum is that, while there are a multitude of low intensity threats, no two are alike. Revolution in the Philippines was different than revolution in Viet Nam. Terrorism in Ireland is different than terrorism in the Middle East. More importantly, the tactics employed in low intensity conflict neutralize many of the traditional military strengths the US has and forces conflict away from firepower and into the psychological arena.

The first step in analyzing low intensity conflict is to look at the low end of the conflict spectrum and define what we are about. Our goal in this part of the spectrum is helping allies to contain small wars before they become large. There are three stages we need to concern ourselves with. The first is peace which, while some violence may occur, does not threaten the existence of the government. Society can generally cope with the level of violence. The appropriate US policy in this stage is to monitor the situation and progress through normal diplomatic relations.

The second stage is instability. In this stage, there is dissatisfaction with the government but it is not well organized. Some of the precipitating factors for revolution are present but revolutionary leadership has not

yet emerged. In this stage, direct military assistance is not needed except possibly as a confidence builder. Nation building can restore both the confidence and the capability of the incumbent government.

The third stage is revolution. In this stage, the opposition to the government has organized and is operating in open defiance. In this stage, some form of military assistance probably will be necessary. The US military must be prepared for direct military action if aid and indirect support measures do not restore peace.

"Low intensity" means low intensity to the US public. The corollary is that the US public may not be willing to pay the price to stay in the conflict (as was the case in Viet Nam.) That suggests that US strategists must invest the time needed to convince the US public that supporting the conflict is in their interests. President Roosevelt prepared the US public for two years before our entry into World War II and still didn't feel comfortable entering the war until after Pearl Harbor was attacked. Presidents Truman and Johnson attempted to wage wars without building public support and both left office before they were Constitutionally required to as a result (37:3-4.) Foreign governments (both allies and opponents) have learned from this that the US cannot tolerate a protracted war and the strategy developed by our ally must lead to victory as soon as possible. Microescalation is unlikely to succeed.

Much of the frustration inherent in our Viet Nam policy was that there were no yardsticks and thus no way to measure progress. Without a reliable measure of success against the communists, US resources consumed (both financial and human) became a measure of failure. To be successful with the US public, there must be a worthwhile goal and some progress toward that goal. Thus, a key part of any US policy must be measures of merit that will demonstrate progress to the American public. Nation building, in addition to integrating what have frequently been piecemeal programs, suggests some areas in which to look for yardsticks.

NATION BUILDING: THE CONCEPT. When instability threatens a friendly government, we usually support those efforts needed to restore stability. Ideally, we give as little direct assistance as possible. The more the US is seen to be playing a key role, the more it appears the incumbent government is a puppet of the US government. And the more it appears to be a puppet, the less legitimate it appears to its own population and the more difficult it is to restore both the power and the legitimacy of our ally.

There is no standard program that will succeed for every ally. Each has a different set of problems and a different internal political situation. Nation building is simply a concept for rebuilding those elements of an ally's

national power that have eroded. In facing instability in an ally, we must help that government look at what their country should be and then help them develop a plan to get there using US assistance as necessary. In all likelihood that plan will involve aid, but the ultimate measure of success ought to be independence from US aid. Without a plan for independence, we don't have nation building, we have dependence building.

Some clues as to when nation building might be appropriate are suggested by McNall and Huggins (30:241-256.) They identify the following eight environmental elements to be predisposing factors for outbreak of revolution. The first is unsatisfactory development (both economic and social) and perhaps more important, the level of development compared to expectations and neighboring nations.

The second factor is the rate of growth in disparity of conditions (or expectations.) Again, the researchers were studying primarily economic and social factors, but any perceived disparity can contribute to the sense of hopelessness that increases a nation's predisposition toward revolution.

The distribution of land and wealth and the perception of the fairness of that distribution are also major factors. Indeed, these are the factors most often used by revolutionary leadership to incite their followers.

Suppression of social or ethnic or religious groups can decouple a government from large segments of its people. Suppression of any determined group forces it to go underground and creates the social infrastructure for an revolutionary movement. In military terms, it creates a social sanctuary for an revolutionary movement.

Foreign presence or influence creates the impression that the incumbent government is being propped up and is not a legitimate governing body. This is the reason the US needs to be low key in supporting its allies. The Southeast Asian communist movement made considerable propaganda value out of our (very apparent) presence in South Viet Nam.

An external war or threat creates dissatisfaction and hardship at home that can be exploited by a revolutionary movement. External wars, or wars of policy, create hardships without summoning up the spiritual resolve of a fight for survival.

Government suppression in general or the failure to allow peaceful change can be a rallying point for rebels. This includes government censorship and control of the media. The failure to allow peaceful change is characteristic of one party politics. The absence of a legitimate opposition to question decisions leads to policies that are progressively more unacceptable to the people.

Finally, the presence of an alternative ideology or alternative leadership outside the scope of the current government can promote or accelerate a revolutionary movement.

Not all of these factors need be present for revolution to occur. In general, several were sufficient to generate the feeling of hopelessness and loss of control that breed revolution. Generally, where revolution occurred, it was triggered by a sudden or dramatic shift in government policy or a change in revolutionary leadership. The goal of nation building is to restore the legitimacy of government and alleviate factors leading to social unrest. Nation building means evolving from instability to peace.

In Europe after World War II, the level of development was well below expectations, the rate of change in economic and social conditions was uncertain, and there was an alternative ideology -- communism -- which promised to cure these problems. The Marshall Plan, which triggered recovery in Europe, was our first major nation building effort.

The scope and optimistic goals of the Marshall Plan meant that there could be no wasted investment. Too many countries with too much industry to rebuild were involved. What we did right in that program is worth thinking about when studying Third World nation building efforts today. First, we did not try to change the form of government. We

used the leaders and the government we found in each country. Second, we did very little direct investment; primarily we restored infrastructure and let the European companies that had survived the war and multinational companies make the private investment (5:239-240.)

Just as informative as the problems we solved in the Marshall Plan are the problems we didn't have to face. None of the governments in the plan was a one party government. All had at least one major competing party in political debates. Often, among our Third World allies, there is no loyal opposition. Or what opposition there is has been suppressed and is unable to carry alternatives to the people. Consider the Shah of Iran or President Marcos of the Philippines. Unpopular or unrepresentative government can make nation building difficult or even impossible; correcting weaknesses in the political structure is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for nation building.

Another problem we will face is inspiring the people. In Europe, the people had known a higher standard of living and needed the means to restore it. In the Third World today, many of the nations have not known prosperity. Creating a vision and inspiring people to pursue it may be the toughest part of nation building and it is a part we cannot directly participate in; it is the role of the nation's government. To fulfill that role, they will need

inspired leadership that seeks a better status quo.

Clausewitz said that wars were contests between societies not armies. We must remember that alliances are alliances between societies rather than governments as well. Actions that do not benefit both societies can only be sustained for a short time. We cannot afford to approach nation building, which may represent a drain on our nation's wealth, as a long term condition to be endured; we must finish it. The Marshall Plan lasted only four years although the recovery continued for many years after that. By 1951, European production had reached or exceeded its prewar output and European markets for American goods were expanding rapidly (5:240.)

The business of government is to govern -- to provide services to its population. The most effective way to prevent or short circuit revolutionary uprisings is to preempt the revolutionary platform as Magsaysay did in the Philippines. He took their main platform, land reform, and implemented it, not just for the population at large, but for the Huks as well. He turned the majority of the population, including many of the Huks, into land owning capitalists in two and a half years. The revolution withered and the Philippine government avoided a potentially fatal uprising (29:183-187.) How then can the concept of nation building be turned into a policy that removes the causes of revolution?

NATION BUILDING: THE POLICY. Nation building is a noble objective; but, in practice, it has often meant providing what lttle support was available rather than providing sufficient (enough of the right kinds of) support to build or rebuild a nation. What is all too frequently missing from our nation building effort is a goal -- a snapshot of where we want to be and how we intend to get there. Without (or with only vague) goals, we have not had yardsticks with which to measure progress.

What is the difference between the uninspiring results of our huge foreign aid expenditures in the Third World today and the success of the Marshall Plan after World War II? How can a nation with destabilizing economic, social, or political problems transform itself into a modern nation with a comfortable standard of living for those citizens willing to exert themselves? These are the questions we must study to develop a coherent nation building policy.

After World War II, the nations of Europe had their industrial bases shattered, but they remembered what it was like to be industrial powers and what it was like to have major cities and museums and the other aspects of modern societies. Developing goals that the populations of Third World nations, without a history of industrial and political achievement, can visualize and aspire to is a much more difficult task -- one that political leaders must

foster if our efforts to help modernize these nations are to be successful. But goals are not enough. Achieving these goals will demand inspired leadership.

This chapter will examine some of the current thoughts about nation building and build the foundation for a comprehensive model against which to evaluate nation building. More specifically, it will explore the subsets of goals we must weave into a coherent nation building strategy and establish yardsticks for assessing the governments and leaders we support.

There is a spectrum of potential problems that need to be solved in most Third World countries. Most of these problems fall into four major areas: security, government, economics, and society. The essence of nation building must be to rebuild each of these major segments into a viable stable system. The success of nation building must be measured not by how long we can keep an incumbent and relatively friendly government in place, but rather, on how many of the nations we support become independent of US aid and how fast they do it.

The first question we must ask ourselves in contemplating nation building is: What is our long term goal? A narrow answer that addresses only short term objectives or only part of the problem cannot build the robust allies and trading partners we need. Our long term goal must be to build or restore a nation's vitality so

that it can contribute to regional and international stability.

The second question is: What can the country do for itself and what can we alone do? Nation building cannot and should not be a unilateral effort by the US. It needs to be a team effort with the US portion reducing gradually until it is negligible. The US can provide only the raw materials for nation building; the national government must build its nation. This, in turn, suggests that there need to be strong linkages between US aid and national policies by the government we are aiding. We can only afford to invest in those countries that demonstrate the will to become strong and independent allies -- if necessary, at the expense of those that do not.

Results will not come overnight. Europe and Japan did not rebuild themselves overnight. Taiwan did not become an economic heavyweight overnight. We must be prepared to adopt a long term outlook and try to nudge allies along feasible paths to military, governmental, economic, and social stability.

We must view nation building in nation to nation terms rather than in government to government terms. This is the best way to avoid entanglement in alliances like the one we had in Iran where we were allied with the Shah and ignored his suppression of political and social institutions until the population was too alienated to manage a smooth

transition toward a more democratic form of government. Our interests in the Philippines were damaged in much the same way by the progressively less democratic policies of the Marcos government and our continued support of him.

Another overarching concept in nation building is that not every government can be democratic in the way the US is democratic. In many countries, a democracy like ours would be an invitation for dictators to buy elections with promises (or cash.) We must ensure that governments make strides toward representative democracy to the degree their societies can support democracy and develop internal methods that ensure there is legitimate opposition in one form or another. Without officially sanctioned checks and balances, no government will remain healthy indefinitely.

One final principle is that only the alliances or parts of alliances that are mutually beneficial survive over time. The US must weigh the benefits of entering into a nation building alliance before committing. If the benefits are not going to materialize, US public support will wither as difficulties grow. Our national policies must focus effort on achievable objectives of mutual benefit.

NATION BUILDING: THE MODEL. Nation building is a multidimensional concept that emphasizes building (or rebuilding) the critical elements of national power so that

the assisted nation can stand on its own. The emphasis of nation building is on self help, with the US in a support role, contributing only what a nation cannot contribute on its own. The goals of the US involvement in nation building are to nurture an open political system, a free market economy, and independence. If we do not build independence, we will build a perpetual drain on our own prosperity.

Nation building consists of supporting the right type of leaders and rehabilitating four major areas of national power: political processes, national security, the economy, and the social infrastructure. The US role is that of supplying the resources and incentives needed to augment a nation's own capability. To draw a parallel with military strategy, these four elements of national power constitute the "centers of gravity" of the types of societies we want as allies. Linking continued US support to positive evolutionary changes in these four areas provides the yardstick against which to measure nation building. Offering sufficient support to allow substantial improvement provides a lever for ensuring that needed reforms are implemented in a timely manner. To draw a further parallel with military strategy, concentrating our aid on those countries prepared to make the sacrifices needed to be independent could be termed applying the principle of mass to rebuilding selected Third World

nations rather than applying the principle of economy of force to them all. Now, we will take a closer look at the areas to watch in nation building.

Leadership. The first, and most important area, is national leadership. Leadership is the essential ingredient in nation building. Without leadership to inspire, motivate, and, if necessary, drive the people, nation building will not succeed. Few followers would have made the Long March in China without the leadership of Mao Tse Tung. More to the point, where would the US be today without the visionary leadership of Franklin, Adams, Washington, and the many others who brought a vision to government and then made that vision work?

James McGregor Burns has studied political leadership and, in his book Leadership, has classified leaders into two categories: the vast majority who are "transactional" and the few who are "transformational." Transactional leaders are ideal for working within the current system and ultimately serve to preserve the status quo. Transformational leaders are those with both the vision and the ability to change the status quo. Transactional leaders offer tangible rewards; transformational leaders offer psychic rewards (2:19-23.)

There are degrees of change needed in nation building. To some extent, we need to identify and promote those

leaders that we believe have the ability to transform, or rebuild, the nation. Seldom will there be a need for a leader like Mao, but we need to avoid leaders that thrive on (or achieve their objectives from) the status quo. If a leader measures success in terms of personal power or the size of his bank account, he is not likely to change the system for the better.

There is one additional benefit to working with transformational leaders. A leader capable of inspiring his people to a new and better vision will not need the same amount of investment as a transactional leader. Transformational leaders are also far more likely to seek early independence from US aid while transactional leaders will enhance their wealth and power by prolonging the aid.

That suggests some yardsticks for leaders. What is it that motivates them? Are they driving their country toward independence or continued dependence on the US? How are they perceived by the public? Will a leader's people sacrifice to build a better nation? These answers are subjective, but, over time, we can develop a good idea of where a leader will take his country. If we don't like the destination, we shouldn't buy a ticket.

Government Building. Hand in hand with identifying and supporting transformational leaders, we must put in motion those actions necessary to strengthen government and

public confidence in government. Without a stable government and public confidence, no amount of US assistance will build a strong ally. Just as competitive strategies are needed to subdue an insurgency, cooperative strategies are necessary to build or rebuild a consensus within the country.

Consensus building means a consensus among virtually all major ethnic groups, religions, political parties, etc. It means developing a platform that incorporates the legitimate and achievable basic needs of all those groups. If a government is to thrive, it cannot be built on the needs of only part of the nation. The other part will eventually rebel. Our biggest foreign policy disasters have occurred when we backed governments that broke faith with major parts of their populations; Iran and Nicaragua are two recent examples.

Strengthening the political process and the sanctity of that process is the next step after consensus building. Strengthening the political process means building the communications channels from the people to the government as well as the mechanical aspects of selecting representatives and conducting the business of government. In some ways, building public respect for the process of governing is even more important than the process itself. Most instances of US involvement in Third World conflict have occurred when the standing government lost the

confidence of the public. The business of government is to govern; if the people lose respect for the standing government, it cannot govern effectively.

The last step is building and stabilizing internal political relationships in several dimensions. How does the executive relate to the legislative and judicial functions? Are those functions separated as in America, or are they all vested in one body? How does the out of power party (or parties) relate to the one that is in power at the moment? How smooth are transitions after elections? Without stable relationships, the political process cannot be stable. And without a stable political process, government will not be stable. Nation builders must identify sources of instability and help the standing government alleviate those instabilities.

Security Building. Often, the most significant challenge to government building is a revolutionary challenge to that government's existence. The first order of business must be to secure the government and stabilize the political situation. No progress will be made with the internal systems in chaos. Ideally, counter-revolutionary war would not be necessary, but, in most cases, our economy of force strategies keep us from seriously addressing a nation's problems until it is struck by an insurgent uprising. Stabilizing the military situation in most cases

involves military assistance to include equipment, advisors, and in a few cases like Viet Nam and Lebanon, even US military forces.

After stabilizing the military situation, the US must provide external deterrence to prevent outside forces from attacking the nation's interests or supporting rebels inside the country. This leg of security building can be tricky as the Central American insurgencies have shown. We have been unable to stop Nicaraguan sponsorship of communist guerrillas in several countries in that region.

Alliance building is the final leg of security building. Regional alliances shift regional strategies from competition to cooperation and provide a larger, more capable allied military force for resisting external forces. No single NATO country, with the exception of the US, could resist the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. Joined together in alliance, NATO has provided the longest uninterrupted period of peace in modern European history. Military alliances also open the door for economic and social alliances.

Economy Building. The most visible aspect of nation building is the economic one. The vast majority of US foreign aid is economic, giving economic measures more visibility both in the target nation and in the US. Our objective cannot be to provide end products; that doesn't

develop economies. We must provide the means for a nation to become self sufficient. Only when it is economically self sufficient can it hope to sustain self sufficiency in other areas.

Direct government investment has not proven effective in developing the markets needed to benefit the American economy. Neither does government investment make the target nation's economy more productive. Nation building needs private investment and private investment will not begin until multinational companies are confident that they can invest, recoup that investment, and make a profit. Developing confidence in the business community will be difficult but needs to be tackled. Each nation will have a different set of problems and hence a different set of reasons why major companies would be reluctant to invest. Nation builders must find out those concerns and alleviate them.

A second area of economy building is infrastructure building. No major industry can be developed without considerable infrastructure, from water and electricity to housing and churches. The major expenditure of the country, unless it is subduing an insurgency, will be infrastructure. Without roads and ports, products cannot get to markets and the economy cannot generate the capital needed to continue economic recovery. The development of infrastructure is particularly important in the smaller

Third World countries where the economy has been ruled by one or two products. In those countries, the infrastructure has generally developed only around those products, typically raw materials like tin or sugar, and needs major enhancements in numerous areas if they are to become economically diverse and independent nations.

Building skills in the workforce is necessary if the economy is to diversify. A one or two product economy will get buffeted by gluts and surplusses regardless of how well that economy is managed. It is at the mercy of forces beyond its control. Building healthy trading partners for the US means building diverse economies in the Third World.

A realistic assessment of which industries could be expected to survive (or thrive) should be accompanied by an assessment of those skills needed, both directly by industry and indirectly by infrastructure, to support economic growth and independence. That should be coupled with programs to develop those skills. This type of government investment will reduce some of the risk inherent in private investment in the Third World.

The final leg of economy building is market building. Not until a country's internal markets are thriving will there be much economic benefit to the US. Then, in addition to importing from the country, we will begin to export to the country, opening new markets for American goods. The development of a merchant class also develops

the middle class which has traditionally been the strongest barrier to communist revolution.

Where would the US economy be today if it were not for the opening of huge new markets in Japan and Europe in the post World War II era? The same opportunities exist today in the Third World but they will be harder to develop. We must take the same long term view of potential allies and trading partners in the Third World that we took of Europe and Japan after World War II.

Society Building. Society building means institutionalizing the changes needed to develop the society along with the government and the economy. In many Third World countries, social practices have long been a barrier to modernization. Government must accelerate the shift in values and traditions necessary to support nation building.

The first step in society building is to raise societal standards. This is a delicate undertaking that requires time and, invariably, leads to raised expectations. Many experts warn against rising expectations in the Third World, and not every Third World country will be able to satisfy those expectations, but no country has successfully achieved significant growth or strengthening without higher expectations. If the status quo were good enough, there would be no opposition and no

threat of revolution. Government should take care to not create unrealistic expectations or make undeliverable promises, but without the prospect of improvement, a government is unlikely to inspire the confidence and, more importantly, the energy of its people.

Few can question the effect Ghandi had on post colonial India. His vision of Indian society shaped the values of the Indian people long after his assassination. He raised the Indian people's expectations and made them believe in an independent India.

The other three areas where government can assist in building a stronger society are the health, education, and media infrastructures. More than merely providing services to the people, these three segments send the message that the people are important and contribute to the higher standards needed to fuel a stronger society. Rebuilding society is one of the frequently overlooked or underemphasized roles the US military can help fulfill.

NATION BUILDING: THE MILITARY ROLE. What role can the US military play in building or rebuilding a nation? There are a multitude of functions that US forces can accomplish to aid in this process. Perhaps more important than the functions they can perform is the influence they can wield. In many (perhaps most) Third World countries, the military is the effective source of power and, as such, carries much

more political clout than does the US military. Our military leaders can have a disproportionately large influence on the nation building process through military to military relationships.

Some obvious methods of influence include training, equipping, and advising the host military forces. In addition, we can provide peacetime military and humanitarian airlift and logistics support. We can help develop or improve the nation's intelligence programs. We can assist them in planning force structure and in operational planning (to include civil affairs.) If appropriate, we can participate in combined exercises that demonstrate teamwork and cooperation between the two nations.

The most important military support we can provide is perhaps in what are traditionally thought of as non-military areas such as public affairs and psychological operations. The presence of US military forces is a powerful signal to both the government and its opponents; thus ship (and other military) visits can be an important influence multiplier for nation building. Civic action programs, such as road and dam building and other infrastructure programs, conducted by military civil engineering teams can give the nation's infrastructure a boost. Field hospitals can provide medical aid for areas that have no hospitals. These areas are representative of

the kinds of nation building aid our military forces can provide.

One last area that deserves special status is reducing military corruption. As stated earlier, in many Third World countries, the military is the primary source of power (of all kinds) within the country. Frequently this power has been abused, sometimes with official sanction, sometimes without. A corrupt military or police force will not win (or deserve) the respect and support of the population. As outsiders with a great deal to offer, we have considerable influence and should use it. Punishing corruption in the military is, or should be, as important as punishing corruption anywhere else in society and, therefore, part of every military leader's agenda. The ideal solution would be to use our military to military relationships to persuade the nation's military leaders to purge their own ranks but experience suggests that anti-corruption campaigns must be imposed on most militaries. No matter what the source of the anti-corruption campaign, rebuilding confidence in national police and military forces is fundamental to nation building.

NATION BUILDING: LESSONS. In pursuing nation building, we must look first to the leaders. Do they have a vision and can they inspire their people with that vision? If not,

then we must look elsewhere for nation building leadership. If the leadership exists, what vision of the nation are we building toward, and where are the shortfalls that will demand US support? The obvious places to look are the four major areas discussed in this chapter: government, military, economy, and society. There may be others. What will it take to move from where the nation is today to where it can be a strong and independent member of the international community? Will the American people support the investment needed to build the nation? These are the questions we must ask ourselves before committing to a nation building program.

Building yardsticks for measuring progress is central to effective implementation of nation building. Too much foreign and military aid has been given away without demanding performance from the recipient government. These "economy of force" aid programs serve only to reinforce the status quo and build dependence on future aid. The US, if it is to implement a serious nation building program must prepare to say "No!" to those countries without the will to follow through. We need allies, not charity cases. Building nations is hard, expensive, and long term work. We can help with the expense; the hard work has to come from the nation itself.

If, despite our nation building efforts, the revolution grows into an active military confrontation, how

can we help? The military decisions and strategy considerations in defeating a revolution are the subject of the rest of this paper. Uppermost would be the consideration that our military involvement should be viewed as part of an ongoing nation building process and that the final goal is still a viable and independent government. The process of nation building doesn't stop if an revolution erupts. It must continue, but the nature of the support we provide changes character. The ratio of military to other forms of aid rises, perhaps dramatically. How can we best help an ally once revolution has broken out? We can start by understanding the nature of revolutionary warfare.

REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

NATURE OF REVOLUTION. In revolutionary war, a nongovernment organization, unencumbered by a population to protect and the other responsibilities of government, attempts to seize political control of a country. For both the incumbent government and the revolutionary force, the war is a battle for survival. One of the key variables in revolutionary war -- one that substantially alters military strategy -- is the fact that the revolutionary force has no country or population to defend. Indeed, it represents the same people and territory as the incumbent government; thus the latter has a difficult time achieving a decisive victory over the revolution. When the battle is not going the rebels' way, they can melt into the countryside, denying the incumbent decisive battle. The incumbent does not have this luxury. More importantly, there is no revolutionary heartland to attack. We must look elsewhere for a "center of gravity." This basic strategic asymmetry has been summed up nicely as being that the revolutionary can attack anything, anywhere, any time, while the incumbent must defend all things, everywhere, all the time (13:21.)

A second factor that has been difficult for the US and other major powers to deal with has been the psychological aspect of revolutionary warfare. Insurgents use

technologically simple weapons with a psychologically complex strategy to offset the technologically complex weapons and psychologically simple strategy of the incumbent force (30:557-568.) The psychological complexity of the strategy springs from several sources. First, the rebel must maintain extremely good security; thus the incumbent forces often cannot distinguish rebels from civilians, making government forces indecisive in many situations. Second, while most incumbent governments try to separate the military from politics, fearing that the army will become too large and powerful, the integration of political indoctrination and military service in revolutionary groups is a major source of cohesion. Third, revolutionary groups exploit patience. They avoid decisive battles and let time and stress weaken the government forces before engaging in the next battle. Finally, revolutionaries have been adept at using family ties to gather support and spread propaganda. Once a son or brother is a member of a revolutionary group, that group has a source of food and support, and the revolutionary political platform is more credible to the rest of the family.

These examples show how rebels have been able to exploit social factors and humanitarian principles to limit the scope of the conflict in their favor. Their choice in selecting those limits has left them with enough military

advantages to survive against superior military force. Primarily, they have (and exploit) military advantages in mobility, surprise, security, and cohesion. They also have a long history of revolutionary fighting to draw from in developing their strategy. The roots of revolutionary doctrine go back 2500 years to Sun Tzu.

Sun Tzu. The first major strategist to discuss revolutionary warfare was Sun Tzu. His major contributions to warfare included the psychological aspects of battle on which most successful insurgencies depend. He emphasized morale and gaining support of the population and asserted that numbers alone confer no advantage. The essence of strategy to Sun Tzu was that armies were only for delivering the "coup de grace" after agents had so weakened and demoralized the opponents that they were unable to resist. The truly superior leader was one who could win a bloodless victory. Sun Tzu provided a wealth of other thought on the art of war but most has been adapted to modern times by Mao (34:39-44.)

Clausewitz. Although Clausewitz is more known for his description of Napoleonic wars and decisive battles, he offered many keen insights into guerrilla, or partisan, warfare as well. He points out that nobody risks war unless they believe they can win. He also points out that

successful partisans, such as the Russians that stalked Napoleon while he withdrew from Russia, were most successful when they didn't allow decisive engagements. He noted that successful partisans have sanctuaries and that they represent, more closely than the government they oppose, national values. Finally, he pointed out that successful partisan campaigns were not decided by single engagements, but rather by the psychological impact of a campaign of many indecisive battles (3:479-484.)

Mao Tse Tung. The most influential writer on revolutionary warfare has been Mao Tse Tung. He adapted what Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and other theorists had written about guerrilla war to the 20th century. His writings on guerrilla war have been the cornerstone of most modern writings on the subject, as well they should, since his strategy defeated Chiang Kai Chek and won control of the largest nation (in population) in the world.

Mao believed, like Sun Tzu, that guerrilla war was neither independent nor decisive. It was one phase of revolution. The guerrilla served the same function as the agent in Sun Tzu's theory; they weaken and demoralize the incumbent army until such time as a revolutionary army can deliver a decisive victory. Mao saw revolution as a continuum where guerrilla war gave way to conventional battle as the inevitable tide turned to the revolutionary

cause. He also considered guerrillas to be an excellent auxiliary force and cited as an example how the Russian partisans magnified the effectiveness of conventional forces during Napoleon's withdrawal from Russia (23:51-57.)

Mao believed that without a political goal, revolutions must fail because the guerrilla lives off the masses and depends on them for support. He further stated that the rebel's primary operating area must be the imperialist army's rear area. The members of a revolution need to be volunteers and be politically indoctrinated. For Mao, that indoctrination improved revolutionary unity and created better role models for delivering his political message to the masses. Mao's emphasis on the political side of revolution sprang from the belief that without political conviction, soldiers fight without determination and can be shaken in their faith. On the positive side, politically indoctrinated guerrilla leaders cemented the relationship between the people and the guerrilla army (23:88-93.)

Mao's political activities were aimed at three major objectives. First, he sought spiritual unification of the officers and the men. Second, he sought spiritual unification of the army and the people. And last, he sought destruction of the spiritual unity of the enemy. He also believed that externally imposed discipline made officers and their men indifferent to each other

(23:88-93.) This points out Mao's belief in the strong dependence of revolutionary armies on cohesion, both internally and between the army and the people.

Mao's fundamental axiom of combat was: conserve your own strength; destroy the enemy's. To implement this strategy, he laid out six "essential requirements" for his commanders. Retain the initiative by using tactical attacks within a strategic defense and tactical speed in a strategically protracted war. Complement regular army operations with guerrilla tactics. Establish and secure sanctuaries or base camps. Understand the relationship between attack and defense. Develop tactical mobility. Establish correct command relationships (23:94-113.)

His operational strategy called for the guerrilla commander to retain the decision to attack, never allowing the initiative to pass to the incumbent army. Deny the enemy a secure base of operations by converting his rear area into a second front. And most important, attack only at points of relative weakness where the guerrilla can concentrate sufficient force to win decisively before reinforcements arrive. Mao placed great emphasis on tactical deception. His expression for this concept was "uproar in the east, strike in the west." By doing these things well, Mao believed he could force the the "unlawful" (or unrepresentative) government into a spiral of increasing severity and repression, further alienating it

from the people (23:94-113.)

Mao taught that negotiation was not for compromise, but to buy time and to wear out the unlawful government. He also taught that intelligence was the cornerstone of successful guerrilla war because it allowed the commander to start only battles he knew he could win. He also stressed "the unity of opposites", that there was an advantage in every disadvantage, and that the commander should exploit these advantages. For example, he pointed out that artillery limits the enemy army to roads, making it predictable (23:94-113.)

Based on Mao's teachings, it has been easy to convince many in the Third World that the West, in general, and the US, in particular, is interested in preserving the status quo and will oppose improving Third World standards of living. This leads to potential revolutions in countries where the incumbent government has not met the expectations of its people, a situation further compounded when those expectations have been unreasonably high due to revolutionary propaganda. People at the subsistence level don't care about politics; they want food, housing, and clothes. Those with little to lose have traditionally been susceptible to revolutionary promises. If history has taught us anything about revolution, it is that military measures alone seldom suffice. Understanding Mao's teachings is a step toward understanding those nonmilitary

aspects of guerrilla war.

PROCESS OF REVOLUTION. The precipitating factors outlined earlier can erupt into revolution when guerrilla leaders attract sufficient support and cooperation from the population to openly defy the government. Once the growing dissatisfaction coalesces around leadership, an organization forms and revolution begins. The political groundwork is usually laid by front organizations which can distance themselves from military or terrorist operations and retain an aura of political legitimacy or even respectability as the political arms of the Palestine Liberation Organization have attempted.

The first phase of revolutionary war is what Mao called the strategic defensive. The revolution's objectives are to build strength and develop sanctuaries. To do this, rebels stay underground and avoid military encounters. They develop their logistical system. At the same time, they try to attract recruits and expand their popular support. A complementary objective during this phase is to accelerate the real and perceived weakness of the incumbent government (30:205-217.)

The initial acts of violence are usually terrorist attacks chosen to illustrate government impotence and revolutionary omnipotence. As these attacks build support for the revolution, the rebels progress into the next phase

in which guerrilla operations predominate, but may be mixed with conventional military operations. The goal during this phase is to increase the pressure on the government and to spread its forces in an effort to defend the entire country. This allows the rebels to isolate and defeat in detail. Mao calls this second phase the strategic stalemate (30:205-217.)

Ultimately, the rebels must defeat the government militarily if they are to present themselves to the population as a legitimate government. The final phase of the revolution is usually a conventional attack on government forces augmented by guerrilla attacks to weaken those forces. The responsibility of the government to protect its people remains a powerful tool for the revolution since the rebels continue to spread government forces thin while preserving for themselves the option to strike at places where they can establish local superiority. Mao calls this final phase the strategic counter-offensive (30:205-217.)

TERRORISM. Terrorism is the conscious exploitation of terror for political purposes. It is important not just because terrorist tactics are common in revolutionary warfare, but also because, as terrorism gathers state sponsorship, the distinction between terrorism and revolution blurs. State sponsorship opens new sources of

funds, creates sanctuaries for revolutionary terrorists, and allows them to expand their political agendas. As the distinction blurs, we can learn more about each by studying the other. In particular, looking at current trends in terrorism may give important clues to future trends in revolutionary war.

Modern terrorism has been highlighted by great advances in mobility and technology. Terrorists are able to assemble, attack, and disperse quickly. Airlines provide mobility and satellite communications provide the audience to give terrorists a worldwide political platform. State sponsorship has created resources and training facilities for paramilitary forces, either terrorist or revolutionary.

Terrorist objectives are a study in effective strategy. Almost every terrorist attack has two purposes. First, the stated political objective, which is to exact some political concession (such as to free other terrorists in captivity.) And second, the unstated terror objective, which is to create fear in the target audience and uncertainty about a government's ability to protect its public from terrorists. These objectives are usually self reinforcing.

As a terror incident unfolds, terrorists use the demands for the stated political objective to attract media coverage and publicity which contributes to attaining the

second objective as well as putting additional pressure on the affected governments to yield to the political objectives. The suspense, and hence the effectiveness, of the media coverage is heightened by creating unacceptable demands and short time limits for meeting those demands. Unacceptable demands are usually reduced during negotiation to imply that the terrorists are acting "in good faith" and to portray themselves as reasonable people pursuing just causes. Media coverage is extended by slipping those (unrealistic) time limits. Although media interest cannot be sustained indefinitely, if the target is important enough, a great deal of coverage (and hence, political and terrorist value) can be exacted (13:19-23.) The kidnapping, negotiation, and subsequent release of President Duarte's daughter by rebels in El Salvador followed this terrorist script and points out the integration of terrorism and terrorist tactics into modern revolutionary war.

The parallels between countering terrorism and revolution are even more apparent when looking at the strategies employed. Effective strategy against terrorism must incorporate both defensive and offensive elements. Reactive, or defensive, strategy relies on intelligence for an accurate picture of terrorist goals and targets as well as information about members and supporters of the group(s). Another key element of intelligence is warning

about probable acts. Once this information is available, defensive strategy identifies measures to prevent attack and also measures to reduce damage (13:19-23.)

Active, or offensive, strategy is aimed at denying infrastructure for recruiting, training, and fund raising. In addition, preventive arrest and preemptive operations contribute to denying the terrorist the opportunity to operate. Public affairs programs aimed at demystifying and deglamourizing the terrorists can reduce popular support. Finally, offensive strategies can attempt to magnify and exploit the friction between and within terrorist groups (13:19-23.)

The importance of effectively countering terrorism, particularly during nation building, is that revolutionary warfare is easiest to defeat in its incipient stage, before open hostilities begin and before confidence in the government has been eroded by terrorist attacks. In this incipient stage, revolution is virtually indistinguishable from terrorism.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR: CONCLUSIONS. There are a number of characteristics that complicate Third World revolutionary warfare for the US. First, for the rebels as well as the incumbent government, it is a war for survival. It is not for the US. This gives the direct participants long term commitment and stimulates more devious strategy.

Second, the distinction between friend and foe is blurred, cloaking the guerrilla and masking his movement. The blurred distinction is created by the appeal of the revolutionary platform to many members of the population, sometimes coupled with the threat of violence against those who reject that platform. Inability to discriminate friend from foe neutralizes firepower intense weaponry. Where the distinction between friend and foe is clear, revolutionary wars are more easily countered as was the case when the British put down the communist uprising in Malaya. In that war, the revolutionaries were Chinese who not only were ethnically different, but also felt culturally superior and tended to cluster in separate Chinese communities making it easy for the British to isolate, and defeat in detail, the revolutionary forces (30:362-369.)

Third, the revolutionary war is an unconventional war. Rebels avoid decisive battle until they have weakened the government forces both spiritually and logistically. Allowing a revolutionary group to dictate the timing and terms of battle can be fatal. Yet, American society runs on rules and fair play; deviating from the rules is abhorrent, but effective counter revolutionary policies may demand harsh measures. The US has some special operations capability, but no overarching doctrine or strategy that can easily be matched to this style of war.

Fourth, revolutionary war is protracted. The US, with

its frequent elections and traditions of impatience, does not cope well with the psychological effects of prolonged (and seemingly indecisive) conflict.

Finally, US political and military strategy has been skewed toward Clausewitz and decisive battles rather than toward Sun Tzu and the psychological dimension of war. Looking at revolution through conventional lenses led us to misperceptions about the nature of the war in Viet Nam. Without the doctrine to combat revolution, we face continued frustration and embarrassment at the hands of logistically and technologically weaker powers that have a workable doctrine.

This description of revolutionary war and terrorism establishes the background for studying strategy at all levels. The problem of countering low intensity threat is that it attacks us where we are unprepared -- where our weapons of mass destruction and our doctrine of attrition are ineffective. The challenge for the US is to piece together a doctrine that fits the low intensity portion of the threat spectrum. Toward that end, much of the doctrine we have formulated for the high intensity portion of the spectrum is still valid if viewed from the correct perspective. The remaining sections of this paper develop that perspective.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY

NATIONAL STRATEGY. National strategy is the art of applying all the elements of national power to the attainment of national objectives. General guidelines for assessing national strategy are in Appendix A, "Ten Tests of National Strategy." The questions in the appendix are one guide for developing US national strategy. In this section, we will concentrate on those questions most pertinent to developing national strategy for countering revolutionary war.

National Problem. Insurgent warfare is a war of attrition conducted on a psychological battlefield, pitting hope against the status quo. There are several psychological barriers inhibiting US policy. The first is our tendency to make premature and/or partial commitments. Before committing to a government (or to a revolutionary group), the US must decide to get all the way in or stay all the way out. Halfhearted commitments, no matter how well intentioned or popular, are an invitation to defeat. The loss of prestige caused by losing a fight or by abandoning an ally is the residue of those halfhearted commitments.

A second, and closely related, issue is that the strategy itself must be decisive -- aimed at victory, not

accommodation. Partial victories are merely foreplay for the next round of fighting. We do neither ourselves nor our allies any good by forestalling a decisive result.

In the struggle for the hearts and minds of a population, military action is only a collateral part of the main political struggle. As long as the rebels maintain secure psychological sanctuaries, they cannot be defeated. They melt back into the population and regain strength. Revolutions must be defeated on psychological battlefields.

South Viet Nam (RVN) failed to maintain its independence in part because the government used US aid and military power as a substitute for winning the population away from the communist revolutionaries. Rather than using US aid to counter the communists while building a better relationship with the population, the RVN government turned the war into a battle between two (unrepresentative) governments with the population and the countryside as the spoils. The Diem government alienated the population with its land tenure system, favoritism to relatives and to the Catholic minority, retention of the disliked French bureaucracy, and tolerance of a corrupt military. By the time Diem was ousted, the communists had a substantial foothold in the country and subsequent efforts to break their hold were unsuccessful (1:1093-11164.)

As noted earlier, a similar revolution in Malaya was

quelled because the British were more paternalistic and popular than the Chinese led communist revolutionaries. The British treated the population with respect and protected traditional social values while the Chinese considered the Malayans to be cultural inferiors. An advantage the British had in Malaya was that the Chinese isolated themselves from the Malayan communities (30:375-394.)

The purpose in raising these two examples is to examine some of the critical factors in countering a revolution. First, outside assistance can be successful as the British were in Malaya, but the outside power must have legitimacy. Second, the British were able to convince the Malayans that the Chinese were the enemy -- the threat to Malayan society. Without doing that, they would have had little chance to do more than sustain a protracted revolutionary war (30:375-394.) Both these factors point out the importance of the psychological battlefield. In both cases, military victory did not occur until after the psychological battle had been won. As Sun Tzu would have argued, the "agents" had so weakened and demoralized the losers that victory was assured. The challenge for the US is to develop strategies for weakening and demoralizing revolutionary movements.

National Interests. Definition of national interests

is perhaps the most important of our national strategy issues because of the need to gain public support for US involvement in a given revolutionary conflict. We must point out the opportunities and threats inherent in the crisis and in US involvement. The prevailing feeling in the US media and in the civilian community during Viet Nam was that there were few national interests involved and that those interests were not worth shedding American blood over. Our government made little effort to convince the American people that the war was important because, on the one hand, North Viet Nam was a weak (and distant) enemy which did not threaten the US. On the other hand, the US was trying to simultaneously initiate the Great Society social reform package and playing up the importance (and potential expense) of the war would have threatened funding for this program. The result was an erosion of national will that grew into a landslide after the 1968 Tet Offensive.(37:34-35,43)

What are some potential interests that might call for US military support to a country? Containing the spread of communism is certainly an important part of our foreign policy. Developing foreign markets for US goods and ensuring access to vital raw materials are two more. Demonstrating the inherent superiority of capitalism is another. Identifying interests is not the tough part of deciding which allies to support. Selecting those allies

with the leaders and the will to succeed, and make us successful in the process, has proven to be tougher.

What does this suggest for the future? Viet Nam should cure us of the notion that we can be just a little bit involved. Partial involvement failed our ally; the RVN built a strategy around US support and had that strategy crumble when Congress witheld the funds to support it. It failed our leaders; our President withdrew from the race for a second term due (primarily) to failed war policy (37:4.) And it failed the country internationally in that diminished respect for US military capability and political resolve preceded and probably contributed to the increase in challenges to US leadership around the world and possibly even to open state sponsorship of anti-American terrorism.

A lesson we should help our allies learn is that they should assess US national interests as carefully as we do, perhaps even more so. Where substantial US interests are not at stake, long term US aid cannot be counted on (regardless of the current mood of the Congress or the President) and US assistance should be viewed as a short term stabilizing measure only. Without military victory or substantial nation building progress, our leaders will have nothing to show the public for their investment.

National Objectives. Developing a coherent set of

national objectives based on our interests is a second important step. Too often, our objectives defy understanding. Were US Marines in Lebanon to stabilize the situation? If so, they failed because unarmed Marines do not terrify terrorists. Were they in Lebanon to demonstrate US resolve? If so, they failed becuse they stayed only until the situation got tense and then were recalled to their ships demonstrating all too clearly the limits of US resolve. Were they in Lebanon to show the flag? If so, they succeeded -- at great cost. The problem with fuzzy, or unstated, objectives is that they defy measurement. They allow you to avoid admitting defeat; but, they also prevent you from demonstrating progress or victory. In an impatient society engaged in a voluntary war, as we were in Viet Nam and will be in future low intensity conflict, inability to demonstrate progress can be disastrous.

Restoring peace and prosperity is the fundamental objective of nation building and nation building is the fundamental objective of any military campaign we embark upon. We can not dictate how an ally will govern. We must decide whether that ally's methods are acceptable to the US public that will have to foot the bill. If there are long term structural problems in the ally's social fabric and he has no plan for fixing them, that ally does not have a viable program and we should be wary of involving

ourselves. In general, we can fix economic problems, but we can't correct psychological ones (like morale or will) and shouldn't try.

Allies. Knowing our allies is not so much a key to strategy as it is a safety net to prevent unwise commitments. How broad is their mandate? If they do not have a broad majority of the population behind them, they may not be as legitimate as we would like to think. If they do have a broad mandate from the people, the revolution is not very broad based and they shouldn't need much help from us. A need for massive US military aid should send up an immediate warning flag. What common interests do we have with our ally? These common interests are the basis of the national interests we will use to justify support from the American public. Is our ally committed to evolutionary change and open political processes? If not, we should think twice about supporting him. Even if the present leaders are responsible, closed political systems too often put in power those who are willing to suppress their countrymen for self interest.

Threat. Who is our opponent? What are his "centers of gravity"? This is perhaps the most important aspect of strategic planning because revolutionary war is fought more in the psychological dimension than in the military

dimension. As we learned in Viet Nam, firepower doesn't solve all military problems. We were able to prevent the enemy from building a decisive campaign but firepower would never have defeated the communist movement in South Viet Nam. Knowing how an enemy thinks affords the best chance of neutralizing his initiatives and successfully pursuing ours. It also provides the best chance of using firepower effectively.

In most cases, studying Mao is an effective substitute for studying the opponent since most insurgencies are variations of the strategy he developed. In some cases, we can study our opponent directly. Ho Chi Minh and General Giap both wrote extensively of their national and military strategy for liberating South Viet Nam and stuck to the broad guidelines they had laid out. We simply didn't pay attention (9:vii-xxvii.)

If national interests dictate that we aid an ally, then those interests should dictate that we establish a standing team of intelligence and national affairs experts to simulate the opposing strategists to include studying their theories if available, interpreting the course of the conflict as the enemy would, anticipating enemy strategy changes, and analyzing the differences between anticipated and actual strategy. The reason for a standing team is to reduce or eliminate turnover and more fully vest the responsibility for assessing enemy intent and anticipating

enemy actions.

Strategy Options. A fundamental step in defeating a revolution is to isolate the rebels as much as possible. Isolate them logistically. Isolate them socially. Isolate them politically. We should examine which, if any, external countries support the rebels and what binds the external country to the revolution. We may be able to drive the price of supporting the revolution high enough to dissuade supporters from continuing. If not, we may be able to find divisive issues that can be exploited to weaken the will of supporters. After isolating the rebels from their external sources of supply and sanctuary, they must be isolated internally. Internal isolation -- breaking the bond between the rebel and the population -- converts a revolution into an insurgency and insurgencies, operating without broad popular support, can be defeated militarily. Most revolutionary groups have factions that may be subject to manipulation and eventual isolation.

We need to remember that the US is not going to win or lose a revolution; only our ally can do that. We can provide technical assistance, logistic support, and interim military support, but we cannot win a revolution. The fact that an external power defeated the revolution would be persuasive evidence that the incumbent government did not have the support of the people. By far, the best help we

can provide is to continue nation building, even after a revolution is in progress, because that demonstrates a commitment to a better society rather than just a commitment to power consolidation. Little genuine progress was made against the insurgents in South Viet Nam until after the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS) program was established in 1967. This was an advisory program for the South Vietnamese militia that was designed to build their confidence along with their competence -- a piece of nation building outside the scope of direct military action. Unfortunately, it was too little, too late (37:234-235.)

Cost of Strategy. The cost of our support will be a ticklish subject. Congress balks at relatively small aid packages to some countries engaged in insurgencies. In this era of tight budgets, it is obliged to do so. Many past aid packages have been granted to countries without the will to build a healthy nation. These commitments just lead to more commitments -- not to robust allies. Justifying foreign and military aid requires careful definition of national interests and objectives and selling those interests to Congress and the public. If direct military intervention is anticipated, the estimates need to embrace the cost in lives. Before committing to a course of action, the National Command Authority needs to know the

worst case outcomes in order to assess the political cost. If President Johnson had had a more accurate estimate of the true cost of the Vietnamese war, we might have either de-escalated our involvement or attempted a more positive approach. Containment of communism was certainly a valid US interest, but the nature of government, the style of leadership, and the cultural system we were supporting should have hinted that victory was unlikely.

We seldom anticipate failure. It is culturally abhorrent to the US. Nevertheless, we have failed and the costs have been high. Some possible costs of Viet Nam include the expansion of Soviet Union military power during the 1970s, while our defense budget suffered Viet Nam backlash. Another cost is the price we pay in international terrorism. Some terrorism would have occurred anyway, but seeing US ineffectiveness in Viet Nam probably emboldened some terrorists and also probably led to more open sponsorship of terrorism and sanctuary for terrorists by some countries.

Limits of Power. Viet Nam also led to a rude awakening in viewing the limits of our national power. We cannot win a revolution unless it is in America. It must be won by a country's own people just as our Revolutionary War and Civil War were won by Americans. Governments or leaders who do not accept responsibility for winning

revolutions (and rebuilding their nation) are poor investments for American support.

We also discovered that firepower, the backbone of US military strategy, was not decisive in guerrilla war. Many observers feel that we lost more hearts and minds with firepower than we gained. The side effects of firepower are attributed to the government we support, not to the guerrillas that motivate that support or to the outside sponsors that provide material support to the revolution. In addition to directly alienating people, our machines (helicopters, APCs, etc) kept South Viet Nam's soldiers flying over or mustering outside villages rather than entering those villages and mingling with the villagers. High technology brought high impersonalization with it (1:1133-1139.)

Devil's Advocacy. Before committing to a strategy, national leaders must review the possible outcomes should our support be ineffective. When is it time to cut our losses? What will convince us we made a mistake? We need some indicators and some reliable means of sampling those indicators to make sure we don't prolong a mistake. The indicators will be different for each type of low intensity threat, but national will and relative strength of forces will always be important factors. If the guerrilla force continues to grow and internal problems continue to decay

after we have invested our support, something is wrong and we had better find out what it is.

Mobilize Support. Once committed to a course of action, we need to mobilize US public support for that action. We must convince Congress and the public that our interests are important, our objectives are clear, and our level of involvement is appropriate for the situation. Without national will, no strategy will succeed. In the international arena, we should posture to increase the number of our allies, as well as their support, and decrease the number of our opponent's allies.

Disseminate Strategy. In the highly political world of low intensity conflict, any US involvement, even if only indirect assistance, will be subject to intense scrutiny by the US public through the media and by other countries. Political constraints may dominate other priorities. Dissemination of precise instructions to political and military leaders in the affected area is essential if political concerns are to be satisfied.

Finally, despite the need for wide dissemination, operations security (OPSEC) demands that some aspects of national strategy be kept classified. Despite the need for OPSEC, there would appear to be room to develop unclassified versions of the National Security Council

directives on US involvement in Third World revolution. Circulation of unclassified policy statements would help win (or retain) public support for controversial positions. If, despite clear statements of national interests and objectives, public support was not present, continued US involvement is probably unwise.

National Strategy Lessons. The first and foremost conclusion that must be drawn about counter-revolutionary strategy is the lesson of commitment. The US must stake out its interests and commitments and stick to them. We gave an open ended and imprecise commitment to Viet Nam and eventually backed out of it. This style of international leadership will neither protect US interests nor promote US leadership throughout the world. The type of commitment we give may have to be carefully worded, but it must be a commitment to victory that we are prepared to honor. Anything less will erode US leadership in the world.

Second, our national interests must be served by the commitment we give, and there must be general agreement (within our nation) that US interests are being served. Fighting an unpopular war serves neither US interests nor (in the long run) those of our ally.

Third, studying our opponent and the psychology of war, particularly low intensity war, is something we have avoided until recently. We need to place more emphasis on

psychology and study of the opponent in all US agencies that might participate in nation building and/or counter-revolutionary war, not just military Special Operations. CHECKMATE has helped us understand Soviet strategy and capabilities better. We haven't lost any ground to Soviet conventional forces, but we have lost both prestige and allies to communist inspired revolutions.

Finally, going to Congress and the public early will force answers to two tough questions. First, what will the commitment cost? Estimating the economic cost and the cost in lives allows the President to assess the political mood of the country and determine if, in his opinion, the American public supports the course of action. And, second, what is the worst thing that could happen if we commit? If we back away? In the end, cost and consequences will drive political decision making. Our present system permits, and even fosters, premature and limited commitments; we need to do a better job in these kinds of decisions.

MILITARY STRATEGY. Military strategy is inextricably entwined in the national strategy we develop. National strategy must dominate, but military strategy will be the most visible manifestation of that national strategy. Military strategy is the art of applying all the elements of military power to attain national objectives. Appendix

B, "Ten Tests of Military Strategy", contains a series of considerations for assessing military strategy in general. This section of the paper applies those considerations to counter-revolutionary war.

The start of a counter-revolutionary combat campaign does not signal the end of nation building. As much as possible, nation building should continue. It may not be worthwhile to continue to build roads or schools if the revolutionary forces destroy them, but some elements of nation building can, and should, continue even during open conflict. Allowing the economy to stagnate will make nation building even more difficult. Allowing the political process to decay may simply reinforce the political message of the revolution. As much as possible, we should help our ally demonstrate to his people that he is concerned about improving their welfare -- an essential element in mobilizing the resources of the country. We need to continue to help, even push, our ally along the path of nation building. The more responsibly our ally can conduct affairs of state under fire, the more legitimate that ally will appear to his people and to the world.

Military Problem. If the situation has deteriorated to the point where military force is necessary, there are two fundamental military problems to be resolved. First, what must be done to defeat the rebels and eliminate the

causes of the revolution? Second, what military roles should the US play in combatting the revolution? This question is unique to the world of revolution. In conventional war, the role of the US would be to meet and defeat the enemy on the battlefield. In revolution, if the US plays too large a role, it will appear that our ally was incapable of resisting the revolution and therefore, was not a legitimate government to begin with. We must limit our role to allow our ally to preserve his legitimacy. Beyond that, our military role in combatting the revolution must complement our military role in nation building. The military commander's problem is how to blend his forces and the inevitable political constraints on force application into a campaign that wins the political war, not just military battles.

There are four fundamental strategies for combatting revolution. The first is to raise the cost of revolution for the rebels and their supporters. The second is to impede the process of the revolution with psychological operations aimed at creating confusion or mistrust, friction between factions, or spreading misinformation. The third is counterforce, with friendly military forces engaging and defeating the enemy. The fourth is hardening the population to make it more resistant to revolutionary platforms and demands. Hardening the populations is normally accomplished via a combination of strengthening

internal security and an aggressive public affairs campaign (30:1-21.)

Counterforce, or direct military action, must be targetted against the rebels' centers of gravity, of which there are normally at least two. The first is the chain of support. Do they get support from an outside source? Or do they tax the population? How can we cut that chain of support? Building a barrier between the revolution and its support has more than direct military benefit. The loss of support can contribute to poor morale within the rebellion, and the loss of prestige that comes from not being able to attack the incumbent government can reduce support from the population. The other center of gravity that must be attacked is the rebels' cohesion. What binds them together and to their political platform, and how can we break their faith in their organization, their leaders, or their political platform? What is decisive and how is it most vulnerable are the fundamental questions for the military commander in developing his target sets.

Link to National Strategy. The first issue in developing military strategy to counter a revolution is to understand the political strategy, including nation building, associated with the revolutionary threat. Ultimate success starts with coordinated strategy. Almost simultaneously, military planners must ensure that

political planners understand the military consequences of political strategy. Combatting revolution requires more finesse than firepower. Political strategists usually have not studied counter-revolutionary warfare as long or as carefully as military planners and will need the insight of those who have. Political constraints and military capabilities must be matched to political objectives to see if those objectives are achievable.

There are three critical questions in assessing the US involvement in counter-revolutionary war. What will end the revolution? What can our ally do for himself? And, can we do whatever else is necessary? We cannot win, but we can prevent a loss while our ally gathers his resources and develops his own strategy for winning.

Allies. Understanding an ally is fundamental to assisting that ally. How do his generals think? What is morale like? Do soldiers take pride in their service? How do the people of the country perceive the government? In too many Third World countries, the government in general, and the military in particular, are centers of corruption and neither have, nor merit, the respect of the population. If this is the case, one of our first military objectives must be to help reestablish the legitimacy of the government and the integrity of the military forces. Without that, political victory is unlikely, although the

military may prevail in the short term.

We can look for opportunities to shore up our ally's capabilities with materiel and training and offer them the experience we have developed from other insurgencies. Where our ally has no capability and no hope of developing capability, for example in overhead intelligence, we can provide US support. Sorting out command relationships is critical if US forces are employed on behalf of an enemy. While Unified Commanders have the authority to establish temporary combined commands, differences in doctrine and coordination problems may limit the effectiveness of a combined command established at the commencement of hostilities. Allocating missions by nation and using national command chains are an alternative. The US should, in most cases, be involved in no more than airlift, reconnaissance, and training, which can be separated from direct action missions.

Threat. Who is the enemy? How does he think? What is his revolutionary strategy? Revclutionary strategy is usually predictable, if only because revolutionary tactics of terror and surprise are so difficult to counter. What target sets will be attacked? How can we defend those targets from attack? How can we take the offensive? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions are unique to each revolution. In each case, the incumbent government

must determine the military "centers of gravity" of the rebels and take the initiative away. A purely defensive counter-revolutionary war cannot be won.

Who are the rebels' allies within the country? Do the rebels have an outside sponsor? If so, how dependent are they on support from that outside sponsor? Can that support be interdicted? What weapons do the rebels have? Will they get access to more? It is no longer a safe assumption that a revolution is tied to low technology weapons, especially if that rebellion has outside sponsors. We are openly considering sending surface to air missiles to Afghanistan. If we do so, communist nations are apt to send high technology weaponry to Third World countries we are supporting when the opportunity arises. Finally, what is the rebels' intelligence network like? What information have they been collecting and how fast have they been able to react to changes in allied plans? Knowing how the enemy gathers information and how quickly it is disseminated is a key to anticipating enemy actions and also allows more effective tactical deception by our forces.

Military Objectives. Defining military objectives is difficult. In low intensity warfare, we are aiding an ally and the military support we provide should be support on the margin. That is, we fill in where and when our ally cannot. As a result, we are (to some degree) tied to our

ally's objectives in countering the revolution. Those objectives must be both clear and decisive if US forces are to support them. If our ally is not determined to win, we should let him lose on his own.

The military combat objectives should be the result of the commander's assessment of the revolution's center(s) of gravity. If the leading center of gravity is a political platform (and it usually is), the incumbent government has to attack politically, or military operations will be in vain. Do the rebels draw support from another nation? If so, why does that nation support them and how can we make that nation stop? Can we interdict the supply lines? Can we attack the sponsor nation? Direct attack on rebel forces has seldom been a winning strategy. We must attack the revolution's central values and eliminate them.

One of the key military objectives of a revolution is to maintain the initiative, that is, to determine the time and conditions of battle. If the government increases its forces, the rebel will attempt to force those additional forces to defend more and more targets, keeping them off the offensive. Counter-revolutionary warfare demands that offensive operations be conducted or the initiative will never revert to the government.

Vulnerabilities. We need to assess our vulnerabilities when we support an ally. In low intensity

conflict, air bases are vulnerable to attack by agents (sappers) and by long range munitions, like rockets. What type does the enemy have? And, how many does he have? Will he use them on us or would they be used exclusively against the government forces? The answers to these questions drive the kind of self defense forces we bring along.

Strategic vulnerabilities are just as important as physical vulnerabilities. We have done ourselves little good by fielding a remarkably secure force with an indecisive strategy. To be successful, we need a winning strategy and good execution. In revolution, the central part of the strategy must be political. Military operations can only buy time for the political strategy to take hold. If our ally has not developed a political strategy for defeating the rebels or is not executing a suitable strategy, US military forces are being exposed to physical danger and the US as a nation is being exposed to potential loss of prestige without a reasonable chance of success. We must ensure that we minimize the amount of strategic vulnerability we accept even to the point of withdrawing US support if our ally doesn't produce with his chosen political strategy.

Dislocate Enemy Strategy. Dislocating the enemy strategy is the best way to reduce risk and offset our own

vulnerabilities. Dislocating the enemy's strategy involves psychological warfare since psychology is the most important dimension of revolutionary warfare. Military victory is seldom decisive; the revolutionary melts into the population to regain his strength and continue the fight another day. To defeat a revolution, you must defeat the rebel's mind.

One way our ally can dislocate the enemy strategy is to coopt the revolutionary platform. If land reform is their primary goal, the government should consider land reforms. In virtually every case of revolution, the movement has been primarily nationalistic and the appeal of the revolutionary has been to needs the people legitimately felt. Alleviating the public's perception of need will cause political and economic support for the revolution to wither. Without that support, revolutionary military strength will weaken as well. We can help our ally develop a public affairs campaign that discredits the revolutionary agenda and incorporates, into the government platform, those elements of the revolutionary platform that will build cohesion between the government and the people.

One thing the US can do to dislocate revolutionary strategy without challenging the legitimacy of the host government is interdict external supplies. Without supplies, the revolution will be ineffective. We can do this by using a combination of economic and political

pressure and, if necessary, military force on suppliers. If supplies cannot be completely interdicted, the US can drive up the cost of supplying the revolution. In some cases, making a nation's support of revolution a matter of public record can cost substantial political capital in countries that nation is trying to influence.

Another military action we can take is to perform static security functions, such as guarding facilities or convoys, freeing our host or ally to conduct offensive counter-revolutionary operations. This allows our ally to concentrate on the offensive operations that can dislocate the revolutionary strategy. This is the least damaging way of providing direct military support to an ally, since it preserves the ally's responsibility for defeating the revolution.

The enemy may be defeated on the battlefield, but until the enemy has been defeated in the minds of the population, our ally cannot win. Building a successful psychological operations program is the responsibility of the host government, but we can provide military platforms and other support to help them implement their program. In addition, we can provide expertise in the development of psychological operations to help translate government objectives into a workable program. PSYOP is the best way to get at the revolution's cohesion, and attacking cohesion is the best way to get at the revolution.

Force Structure. Forces available will dictate how fast and how effectively a revolution can be defeated. Developing the best force structure for countering a revolution depends on the situation, but in the initial stage of counter-revolutionary war, the mix of talents needed will almost certainly not be the mix of talents on hand. Thus, developing force structure for counter-revolutionary war is more often a matter of training the forces available rather than finding the perfect mix of forces in the inventory.

The most important attribute of force structure must be its flexibility, both physical and mental. Almost the only certainty in revolutionary war is that when the rebels feel their tactics have been effectively countered, they will change tactics. The government has to be prepared for those changes and that preparation is primarily mental. It must be able to re-role forces and react quickly to changes in tactics while reassuming the initiative.

The US force structure is currently skewed toward large scale, high technology, firepower-intensive conventional war. Most of that force structure is inappropriate for counter-revolutionary war. To be a more effective ally, we need to develop and field forces optimized for countering revolutions. Special Operations force structure is appropriate in some ways, but most of

our conventional systems still rely on massive firepower. Even more important, the systems we develop depend heavily on high technology maintenance and support systems that our Third World allies will have difficulty supporting without our help. Thus, these systems build in long term dependence on the US contrary to the goal of nation building. Developing counter-revolutionary systems that are simple to maintain, yet effective in a low technology war, should yield nation building (and political) benefits out of proportion to the costs.

Regardless of the force structure needed or available for the counter-revolutionary campaign, effective command and control of those forces are essential. In most cases, command and control will need to be much more political than in conventional military operations because of the political nature of the war and the consequences of "short rounds." In the Philippines, Magsaysay personally authorized each and every air strike (30:375-394.) In conventional war, the invader seldom is concerned about collateral damage and uses firepower to minimize his own casualties. In revolution, both sides must consider the political impact of collateral damage. Because rebels generally have much less firepower than incumbent government forces, this inhibits the government far more than the rebels.

Cohesion. Reduced dependence on firepower increases dependence on leadership and cohesion, two areas where the rebels generally have an advantage (if not, the dissatisfaction would not have proceeded to open revolution.) Leadership and cohesion are particularly difficult for the US, or any external power, to build. Recognizing adequacy of leadership should be an important part of the decision to get involved in the first place.

Cohesion is perhaps the most important factor in revolutionary war. The revolution almost invariably has strong cohesion forged around political beliefs. Government forces are far more likely to suffer from a lack of cohesion. Building cohesion within the government and the government forces is a precondition to building cohesion between the government and the population. And cohesion between the gove ıment and the population is essential for success in counter-revolution. The French overthrow of the Algerian rebellion is an exception to this rule. However, when President DeGaulle realized the resistance of the Algerian people to (and the cost of) maintaining French rule, he began laying the groundwork for the eventual negotiated independence of Algeria (1:1006-1025.) Thus, for Algeria, military defeat still led to political victory.

Intelligence. Insurgency demands HUMINT moreso than

technical intelligence. We cannot develop HUMINT networks quickly; so effective counter-revolution will require that our ally have, or develop, a HUMINT network. Counter-revolutionary operations are likely to be ineffectve until such a network is established. Since reliable HUMINT is seldom available in a revolution ridden country, we may have to depend on technical intelligence and US support until the host government can develop HUMINT sources. In the intelligence area, an effective intelligence sharing program is extremely important.

The intelligence network, in addition to identifying potential military targets, needs to identify sources of logistics, recruiting, revolutionary tactics (particularly how they intimidate the population), and leadership. In addition to timely collection and dissemination, the intelligence program should reveal what intelligence the enemy is collecting so that deception programs can be conducted.

Despite the emphasis on HUMINT, there are some circumstances where high technology intelligence collection may also be useful. The use of sensors and overhead imagery can quickly detect movement and massing of revolutionary forces and can complement HUMINT in targetting by showing where and how enemy forces are deployed and where those forces are weakest. The French used photo reconnaissance of Algerian villages to detect

changes in activity and were able to track and defeat rebels without depending on HUMINT (25:7-8.)

Com at Support. The essence of strategy is to avoid an enemy's strengths and attack his weaknesses. Rebels can be expected to change their style of attack and their target sets frequently. As we become proficient in defending one type of target, they will select another. In doing this they will complicate the problem for the defenders as much as possible. Switching from day to night, from urban to rural, from military attacks to agent sabotage all place different demands on the defending forces. The combat support system must respond by delivering and supporting the types of weapons and skills needed in a hurry. Our current logistics system is designed for moving large volumes of resources to predetermined places. To be more effective in countering revolution and to help our ally establish an effective combat support system, we need to develop logistics systems that that are capable of moving a few items to the right places quickly, a logistics system based on velocity rather than mass.

Rates of resupply limit the ability of counter-revolutionary forces to advance and to expend weapons on the enemy. To limit exposure and preserve mobility in the field, rapid distribution of supplies must

be made on demand. This is one of the areas where air has traditionally been valuable to counter-revolutionary forces. To ensure that our support system works, we need to defend in-country assets, to include supply warehouses and transportation capability. This preserves our ability to support troops in the field.

Strategy Dissemination. Understanding our military strategy is essential for our own and our allied governments. The more deeply involved the governments are in developing and implementing the strategy, the more cohesive the counter-revolution effort will be. Lack of confidence by either politicians or generals in one another can lead to ineffective strategy. In Viet Nam, US politicians were not confident that US generals understood counter-revolution well enough to develop and execute an effective strategy; so politicians developed key parts of the strategy, such as rules of engagement and air targets (37:71-72.) The result was microescalation rather than an attack on one of North Viet Nam's centers of gravity. Our ally was the loser; our opponent the winner.

In addition to politicians, subordinate commanders must understand the military strategy. Virtually every military operation is suboptimal from the individual unit's perspective. The role of the strategy is to make the overall counter-revolutionary program successful. Without

a deep appreciation for his unit's role in the overall strategy, a unit commander may be unable to inspire the vision and cohesion needed to successfully counter a revolution.

Military Strategy Lessons. The US cannot win a counter-revolutionary campaign for an ally; our ally must win for themselves. It is their problem, not ours. We can and, when possible, should help them to solve that problem. But, we need to remind ourselves that the problem is (at least partially) a matter of popular confidence in the government, not just revolutionary violence.

We need to study campaigns of revolution and identify those elements of doctrine appropriate for US policy. Given the strong reliance of Marxist governments on revolution, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that even a conventional war against a communist nation or alliance would be accompanied by guerrilla operations which we would have to oppose using counter-revolutionary military doctrine. This also suggests that studying counter-revolutionary doctrine should not be concentrated in Special Operations. Studying counter-revolutionary doctrine will also allow us to better understand and support the investment needs of low intensity conflict. Issues of which sensors and what platforms are best for low intensity conflict and how much we, as a nation, are

prepared to invest, will drive the force structure of our Special Operations forces and could influence investment elsewhere in our conventional forces.

Of the major types of counter-revolution strategies, the US can aid in raising the cost of revolution by interdicting external supply channels either with naval quarantines or with aerial bombing campaigns. We can advise on pychological operations campaigns aimed at building cohesion in the population or breaking it down in the revolutionary movement. In addition, we can provide platforms for host nation psychological operations, and we can provide intelligence, logistical, and medical support. Finally, we can conduct some of the defensive elements of the counter-revolution campaign.

Some areas to watch out for include overlapping (or underlapping) responsibilities that can result from how those responsibilities are allocated between the US and the host. In addition, all firepower is expended in friendly territory, hence excessive use may well alienate more people than it liberates. The ultimate winner in a revolutionary war will be the side that that forces the other to lose its cohesion. It is up to the government to apply its power wisely to both build lasting cohesion with the population and break down the revolution's cohesion. That is the essence of military counter-revolutionary strategy.

AIR STRATEGY. The overwhelming majority of a counter-revolutionary campaign must be fought on the ground by the ground commander. That is where the hearts and minds of the people are and that is where the real revolutionary war is fought. Nevertheless, air can play a significant role in helping the ground commander. Air strategy is the art of applying all the elements of air power to attain military and, hence, national objectives. Appendix C, "Ten Tests of Air Strategy", contains a series of issues for the air component commander to consider. This section applies those considerations to counter-revolutionary war.

The Air Problem. The first order of business for the air commander is to determine how air fits into the overall military strategy. Accordingly, he must understand that strategy and the political goals and constraints limiting it. In addition, he must understand the command relationships between US and host nation forces and the allocation of responsibility that goes with those command relationships. Are US forces to be employed only in supporting roles or also in direct combat? What are the rules of engagement for US forces? What operations may US forces conduct and what operations may they not conduct?

Virtually every major airpower capability has been

employed gainst insurgency at some time. Even suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) and ther high technology electronic warfare capabilities were employed in Viet Nam. However, the most frequent (and effective) role has been airlift. Other common roles include reconnaissance, psychological operations, and, to a lesser degree, close air support, counterair, and interdiction (25:3.)

Airlift includes aerial delivery of troops (including airdrop or helicopter insertion), resupply of forces, and medical evacuation. Some form of airlift has been used in virtually every counter-revolutionary campaign. Helicopters have generally been the most efective platforms since they can be used to resupply and pick up troops in remote locations (25:3-4.) There have been other, more unique uses of airlift as well. Magsaysay used light planes to visit troops in the field, building morale in his forces and cementing his backing from the Philippine population (27:375-394.)

Reconnaissance has always been important in counter-revolution. Photographic intelligence can reveal enemy force structure, signs of movement, and target identification. In addition, in the Malayan revolution, photo mapping was needed due to the poor quality of existing maps (25:8.) The French used aerial reconnaissance to learn the patterns of activity in Algerian towns and were able to anticipate enemy presence

from signs of unusual activity (25:8.) High altitude photography can provide excellent resolution without the rebels even knowing they are being observed.

Psychological operations cover a broad area of applications. The content of a PSYOP campaign should be developed by the host government, but the aerial platforms may well be ours. In general, voice broadcasts have been more effective than leaflets since often large percentages of the target population are illiterate. Other past uses of PSYOP include loud noise broadcasts over revolutionary territory at night to keep the revolutionaries from resting, and the distribution of booby trapped bombs and bullets. The PSYOP campaign should be aimed at the revolutionary with as little impact on the civilian population as possible (25:10.)

Close air support (CAS) has been a two-edged sword for governments fighting revolution. It can be effective against small groups of the enemy in close proximity to friendly forces, as would be the case in an attack, but CAS can also result in collateral damage to friendly populations and assets. To effectively employ CAS against a revolutionary force, we must be able to distinguish the rebels from friendly forces and from the civilian population and use adequate safety margins for weapons delivery. Timely intelligence, quick reaction, civil-military cooperation, and tight control in the target

area are the keys to effective CAS. One benefit of close air capability is that it discourages massing by the rebels. In this sense, CAS deters revolutionary attacks and shortens those that do occur. As a counter-revolutionary campaign begins to succeed, the rebels will become more isolated from the population and, hence, more vulnerable to air attack.

Counterair is only necessary when the revolutionary forces or their supporters have air capability, which is usually not the case. Therefore, use of counterair is unlikely, but it is still important to have the capability to be called upon if necessary. For example, North Vietnamese air forces were engaged numerous times.

Interdicting lines of communication has generally not proven effective in defeating revolutions because in most campaigns, rebels have had multiple lines and severing all of them has proven difficult. Algeria was an exception because the lines of communication from Morocco and Tunisia were exposed and, therefore, vulnerable (25:9.) The more effective tactic has been to attack sources of supply when able. Despite the problems, interdiction can deny the rebels easy lines of communication and drive up the cost of revolution.

Why discuss defense suppression and some of the less likely uses of air in counter-revolutionary war? One of the cornerstones of revolutionary warfare doctrine is to

exploit surprise. If air is hurting the rebels, they will try to neutralize that threat. Recently, the US has publicly debated sending surface to air missiles to anti-communist Afghan rebels to allow them to escalate the fight against the Soviet Union. We should anticipate that the Soviet Union will respond with high technology weaponry in wars of national liberation that they are sponsoring around the world. Because of the gradual technological escalation, we need to be prepared to fight counter-revolutionary war against more sophisticated weapons as well as tactics.

The challenge to the air commander is to blend those capabilities that can best support the counter-revolutionary effort into a productive campaign. At the same time, he needs to look at the full spectrum of potential air assets and be prepared to call on those other capabilities, such as counterair, that might be needed should the tempo increase. Since the revolutionary strategy will be to avoid friendly strength, as new capability (such as CAS) is introduced into a counter-revolutionary campaign, we should expect the rebels to change tactics to try to minimize the threat from the new capability. The air component must adapt to changes in revolutionary strategy if our ally is to gain or retain the initiative.

Link to Military Strategy. The most important question for the air commander is how can air best support the military strategy? Unless the air commander develops an air strategy and can articulate it persuasively, air strategy is likely to devolve into uncreative support roles for ground forces, much like those in North Africa during World War II before the change in strategy that made air a separate component, independent of the ground force commander. Airlift and air reconnaissance are the two most important roles in counter-revolution, but others can play unique and significant roles as well.

What is the nature of the airlift requirement? How much airlift is needed depends on the ground force strategy. Will there be a lot of small patrols needing regular resupply? Or will US forces be garrisoned at a few main bases? The strategic lift requirements will be about the same for given force sizes, but the intratheater lift needs will vary with the strategy. What are the intratheater lift requirements? Will there be lots of small loads going to numerous sites? Or only a few major loads going to few sites? That may determine whether we need C-12/C-23 type carriers or C-130's. How will aeromedical evacuation be handled? Will Army helicopters evacuate all the way to aerial ports? Or will Air Force intratheater lift assets need to be fitted for litters?

What is the nature of the reconnaissance problem?

Will photo reconnaissance be adequate? Or will other types of sensors be needed? What information does the political-military community need from reconnaissance assets? Are we using it to identify targets or to assess damage or to determine normal versus unusual activity levels? Do we need electronic intelligence platforms like the EC-47s in Viet Nam? Would we be better served by O-2/OV-10 forward air control aircraft with verbal reporting rather than photo or electronic intelligence platforms?

The answers to these questions depend on the nature of the conflict, but in most counter-revolutionary situations, low technology solutions have been more valuable than high technology solutions. Part of the reason is that rebels often select tactics that neutralize the value of technology. The more important reason, though, is that the government we are assisting will seldom be able to independently continue high technology approaches to counter-revolutionary operations, and the ultimate purpose of our involvement is to help that government become self sufficient, not to prolong its dependence on US support.

Will close air support capability be needed? Would having the capability on hand deter the rebels in any way? Would it complicate their problems? Often, the presence of airpower is an important psychological factor, particularly in revolutionary warfare, where government force projection

is important. What kinds of targets will CAS aircraft be allowed to attack? What kinds of weapons will work best against those targets? How can collateral damage be limited? How should the sorties be controlled? Only after looking at these questions can the air commander determine the best missions and aircraft for conducting close air support. In general, long loiter time aircraft have been more effective than the high performance aircraft we are now producing. In the long run, it may be more advantageous to our ally if we purchase appropriate aircraft from international sources rather than selling or giving them US aircraft that are too fast for the mission or too complex to maintain after we leave.

PSYOP programs can be supported with a multitude of airframes but, as indicated, one of our prime considerations must be making our ally self sufficient as soon as possible. Special Operations forces can assist in building a PSYOP program. The yardstick for evaluating PSYOP is the impact it has on the revolution's cohesion, both internally and vis-a-vis the population. If the program can discredit revolutionary values and leaders among the population; if it can confuse or disrupt their operations; if it can pit revolutionary factions against each other; then it has been successful. Air can play an important, but only complementary, role in the overall PSYOP campaign; the ground forces are the heart of the

PSYOP program.

As noted earlier, counterair is a high technology aspect of war that is unlikely to be needed in counter-revolutionary war. However, like in Viet Nam, it could become necessary as part of an interdiction campaign against a state sponsoring the revolution. If a counterair phase is necessary, we would need to carefully assess the threats and the rules of engagement. For example, if the primary counterair threat is infrared missiles (air or ground launched), the primary self protection expendables will be flares. If, on the other hand, the threat was a mix of RADAR and IR missiles, both flares and chaff would be necessary. Controlling exchange ratios will demand that we keep sufficient stocks of those expendables needed to fight the counterair war.

With regard to rules of engagement, if positive confirmation of hostile aircraft is necessary, then beyond visual range missiles will not normally be employed, and we will need infrared missiles for our aircraft. That would also suggest a predominately F-16 counterair campaign since the RADAR advantages the F-15 has would be largely neutralized and the F-16 could be used in air-to-ground and offensive counterair roles as well as air-to-air.

Interdiction campaigns, if they are conducted, are heavily dependent on intelligence and targetting. Interdicting redundant lines of communication, even with

intense tactical air as we had along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, has generally been ineffective. Only where nonredundant links or facilities can be identified and targetted can an air interdiction campaign decisively wound the enemy. Air interdiction can be used to drive up the cost of the rebellion, especially if it is employed in conjunction with a surface interdiction campaign. Selecting the best platforms and weapons depends on target selection. Again, unless threat dictates high technology weapon systems, we should encourage weapon systems and intelligence programs that are within our ally's capabilities, even if we have to fund those systems. The sooner we can leave our (politically secure) ally, the more successful we have been.

Air is never likely to be a decisive strategy in counter-revolution. Destroying the cohesion of the rebels must be done on the ground, in the minds of the population. Air can, however, be a decisive tactic, as it was when Linebacker II bombing forced a ceasefire and peace treaty in 1973 (31:212-213.) Even that was successful primarily because it was aimed not at a true revolutionary movement with broad popular support, but rather, because Viet Nam was a war of aggression disguised as a popular uprising and the attacks were against the industrial base of the aggressor nation. A counter-revolutionary air campaign must be aimed at supporting the overall strategy for

breaking down revolutionary cohesion. No strategy will be decisive until it has accomplished that end.

Once the outline of the air campaign has been determined, the command and control superstructure can be overlayed and relationships with the joint and combined commands can be built. If the US air operation is advisory only, a military assistance group may be all that is needed. If we have a small active role, a composite wing may be the best organization. If we have a significant role to play in stabilizing the situation, we may have a multi-wing air component and a complex support tail to set up and operate. If our support is limited to those functions carried out by Special Operations, Special Operations command and control systems should be sufficient. Regardless of the initial command relationships established, we must have a system flexible enough to react to changes in weapons or tactics by the rebels.

If US involvement grows beyond Special Operations toward the kind of a force structure we maintained in Southest Asia, the Tactical Air Control System will have to be adapted or a comparable system established. One final organizational consideration is the use of composite rather than specialized wings. If success hinge on cohesion, it may be preferable to have composite wings, with a mix of fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and Special Operations

aircraft at each base to facilitate face to face planning and to build cohesion within our forces. If the success of combined operations will depend on close Army/Air Force cohesion, it may be advisable to garrison Army units at air bases.

Control of the Air. If our control of the air is challenged, we will have to assess the threats and how they can be neutralized and then develop the forces necessary for the task. The best place to destroy the enemy air force is on the ground. Forcing aircraft to the ground and then attacking them on their airfields will require force packaging that includes escort and possibly defense suppression forces as well as attack aircraft. The strength and quality of the enemy forces will determine the mix of escort and defense suppression needed. Assuming we have control of the air, what next?

Carry the Fight to the Enemy. Carrying the fight to the enemy in a counter-revolution is both difficult and different from the high threat scenarios we normally practice. The most significant difference is target identification. In counter-revolution, targets are difficult to identify and misidentification can have devastating results. Thus, the need is clear for much tighter control of air strikes, particularly when they are

in close proximity to friendly troops or friendly population centers. In counter-revolutionary air operations, almost every strike needs to be a surgical strike. Another difference between low intensity and high intensity air operations is the tactics. The primary threat in counter-revolution is ground fire so tactics must minimize time spent in the enemy's ground fire envelope.

We must attack his most critical assets at their most vulnerable points. The nature of the war will dictate the kind of force packaging we need to defeat the enemy. Rather than packaging air-to-air and defense suppression with attack aircraft as we do in a high threat environment, it may be more effective to package attack aircraft and air assault teams together to dislocate enemy forces with attack aircraft and defeat in detail by landing the air assault forces. This tactic was particularly effective in the French campaign against the Algerians (25:6-7.) The short duration of the opportunity to attack revolutionary forces is another significant characteristic that limits our ability to attack. To be effectively employed, force packages will have to be adapted to specific targets by the on-scene commander at the time of the attack. In addition, the entire package will have to stand alert together if the window of opportunity is to be exploited.

Maintaining the Initiative. Seizing and maintaining

the initiative means forcing the enemy to react rather than allowing him to act. This is precisely what the rebels try to force the government to do. When the counter-revolutionary effort can force the rebels to react, the government is winning. Normally what forces the rebels to react is not direct military pressure, but rather the psychological impact that effective political, social, and security measures by the government have on the population and on recruiting and other support drawn from the population. If the rebels lose the support they were counting on, they may be forced to accept larger risks to establish their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Also, if they lose popular support, we have accomplished the most important step in isolating them. We have turned revolution into insurgency.

The Tet Offensive in Viet Nam was initiated for precisely that reason; the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were losing influence in the provinces and needed a major campaign to restore their legitimacy (20:110-114.) The result was exactly what we, as counter-revolutionary forces, should have hoped for: a major military defeat brought on by a desperate attack to regain lost legitimacy. It is a sad turn of history that the publicity surrounding that attack turned a military victory into a stunning political defeat in the US homeland.

Controlling the timing and tempo of a revolutionary

war is difficult until the rebels can be isolated from the population. As long as they are capable of melting back into the population, they control the tempo of the war. In practice, isolation has only been achieved in the latter phases of counter-revolutionary campaigns. Once the government has gained control of timing and tempo, the revolutionary strategy has been defeated. This is another reason why breaking down the cohesion between the rebels and the population is so important.

Psychological Impact of Air. The psychological impact of air can be particularly important in revolutionary war. The appearance of air is force projection, even if no target is struck, and the speed of air can prevent the rebels from sustaining a tactical advantage when they momentarily achieve one. In addition to the conduct of explicit psychological operations, there are several other ways we can exploit the psychological impact of air.

First, we can attack the rebel's command and control network, breaking down his internal command and control. Despite the fact that revolutionary war is a low technology endeavor, modern rebels rely on radios and other modern electronics for command and control of many operations. When command nodes can be identified accurately enough to be attacked, we can destroy them. More often than not, the revolutionary command structure will shift location

frequently, denying us the opportunity to destroy it. In those cases, we still may be able to deny the enemy the use of the network by jamming its frequencies. Another form of attack is to exploit the information being passed on the command and control network. Any of these methods can damage the aura of superiority the revolution must establish to retain influence with the people. They allow near real time disruption of revolutionary battle plans, and foster compromise of future plans.

A second method of exploiting the psychological impact of air is to use air to create tactical deception. In revolutionary war, tactical deception must be geared to the ground force battle plan, but since air is often the first force to make contact with the enemy, it offers the first opportunity to deceive as well. Air attacks can be used to create the impression of an attack along one axis when the actual ground force attack is planned for a different one. It can be used to indicate an attack when none is coming, thereby forcing the rebels into defensive positions. And, it can be used to wear down rebels and exhaust them before a battle on the ground is initiated.

Responsive C3I. One of the keys to effective counter-revolutionary operations is responsiveness. The quicker we can react to an attack and meet force with force, the less time the rebels have the advantage. While

the emphasis in conventional command and control planning is on survivability and redundancy, the emphasis in counter-revolution must be on fast reaction.

Improving the intelligence/operations interface is one key to fast reaction. The intelligence community must understand what information the operators need and how fast they need it; as stated earlier, the window of opportunity for counter-revolution operations is small. The best way to improve this interface is to exercise it regularly using counter-revolutionary scenarios. Special Operations forces exercise regularly, but conventional forces (and the intelligence units that support them) usually exercise under high threat, conventional scenarios that have starkly different dynamics.

The quantity and quality of intelligence must be tailored to the revolution. In general, HUMINT will be relatively more valuable than in conventional wars and sensor intelligence relatively less valuable, but the best mix will depend on the nature of the revolution and the terrain it is conducted in. Because of the dependence on HUMINT, our intelligence network will have to be linked very closely to the host nation intelligence network. At the same time, we may be able to provide our ally with information he is not capable of collecting on his own through our high technology sensor programs.

In most cases, a counter-revolutionary command and

control system will operate in a benign environment. While all major functions will be needed, those areas, such as defensive counterair, that are not regularly called for, can be understaffed. In the unlikely event that the revolution has sponsors willing to commit modern aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, we can expand to a full air command and control system in which case a number of new issues will have to be addressed. Are specialized subnetworks, such as air rescue, adequately supported? Is there a single manager for air defense and airspace control? Are the offensive and defensive air wars fused under a single commander?

The gap between what intelligence we have and what intelligence we need will never be closed, but there are, nevertheless, some important questions to ask ourselves. How much of what kind and how current must our intelligence be to attack each of the targets we propose to attack? The importance of these questions is magnified by the cost of collateral damage to the government. If the intelligence community cannot satisfactorily provide enough of the right kind of intelligence in a timely fashion, air will be ineffective or worse, counterproductive. If we fall short in any area, we need to look at how to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and adjust the system.

What Could Go Wrong? The most important question a

commander must ask himself is what could go wrong? Strategists on the other side of the conflict will be striving, using every asset available, to make our strategy fail. Within our own forces, uncertainty, misunderstanding, and poor execution -- the friction of war -- can all contribute to failed strategy. The surest protection against enemy success is to anticipate potential failure modes and be alert to their indicators.

Technological escalation introduces a new factor into contingency planning. In conventional war, we assume the enemy and his allies will use every weapon at their disposal and will be unable to escalate beyond that. In a revolution, our force structure will normally be based on those weapon systems we need to counter the revolutionary capabilities. Bringing unnecessary or unusable weapons into the theater merely increases the rebel's target set without providing military value. The danger is that rebels may be able to acquire through sponsors or third party governments significantly more advanced weapons (in limited quantites) and employ those weapons with devastating results. The use of the Exocet missile by the Argentinians against the British fleet in the Falklands war surprised the British and caused severe damage, including one ship sunk. Surface-to-air missiles, when not expected, could do considerable damage to our air assets, particularly airlift.

Tactical escalation can also be a significant contingency planning problem for the air commander in counter-revolution. Because the nature of revolutionary war is to exploit surprise, shifts in tactics can be more devastating than in conventional war. The bombing of the Marine barracks represented a sharp escalation in the tactics of the war in Lebanon. Not every shift can be anticipated, but in revolutionary war, tactics, rather than technology, constitute the main rebel strength and deliver most rebel weapons. The air commander must anicipate the tactical options for weapons delivery available to the rebel forces and tailor his strategy to those options.

Cohesion Through Strategy. Cohesion is the key to success in revolutionary war. Generally, the rebels start with better cohesion and the government starts with more power. The task facing the government is to spend power (military, economic, and social) to build its own cohesion and break down that of the revolution. Governments that succeed in changing the balance of cohesion have prevailed; those that haven't have been replaced.

The air commander cannot directly break down revolutionary cohesion but he can influence that cohesion in a number of ways. By raising the cost of revolution through interdiction and attrition and by building the staying power of the government through a variety of

support measures, he can make the situation seem more hopeless to the rebels and their sponsors. Psychological operations can create confusion and mistrust, increase friction between factions within the revolutionary movement, and spread propaganda disparaging revolutionary leadership and platforms. Finally, direct air support of ground forces magnifies their effectiveness relative to that of the rebels.

The more effectively the air commander builds cohesion in his own forces, the more effectively he will be able to contribute to the destruction of revolutionary cohesion. Building cohesion demands that subordinate commanders and their people understand the strategy; so dissemination of the strategy and philosophy behind that strategy must permeate the ranks. At the same time, the air commander must contribute to cohesion within the joint and allied command structures; thus, he must be able to articulate the combined air strategy and explain how it contributes to the overall military and national strategies. Against this need for broad dissemination, the commander must weigh the value of security. OPSEC may dictate that the strategy, or portions of it, not be disseminated to some units -- or be disseminated at the last minute. Making these decisions is a responsibility nobody else in the air chain of command is in a position to make.

Air Strategy Lessons. Conclusions about air strategy begin with the roles and missions of air in counter-revolution. What roles can the air commander perform? What assets will he need to perform them? And what ground and air infrastructure will he need to support them? The answers to these questions spring from the national and military strategies the air commander has been asked to support.

What missions can air alone perform? How can air best support the military strategy? What operations must be supported by airlift? What types of air reconnaissance will be effective in a given revolutionary war? Can we identify targets precisely enough to risk close air support? What PSYOP campaigns can air support? Will counter-air be needed? What interdiction targets might severely damage the enemy? There are many questions and few answers; but, perhaps that is best. Answers build rigidity. Flexibility is an asset in any military campaign; in a counter-revolutionary campaign it is absolutely essential.

The ultimate objective of the air strategy must be to help destroy revolutionary cohesion. Large scale firepower is not the answer; it can alienate the population and thereby strengthen the insurgent's indigenous position and support. Exploiting the psychological impact of air on the battlefield by disrupting command and control systems and

creating deception is one of the most important contributions air can make. However, the most important contribution the air commander can make is to help the host nation air commander build a practical and sustainable air campaign that can be continued long after US withdrawal.

CONCLUSIONS

Doctrine is not a set of answers; it is a set of questions woven into a framework of beliefs about how to study war. The answers to doctrinal questions provide the basis for strategy. Strategy is the marriage of doctrine to situation. Without a situation, strategy is an empty concept. Repeatedly asking doctrinal questions adjusts our strategy to our improving understanding of the situation and tightens our grip on victory. As a result, the conclusions we can draw from this, or any theoretical study, are not so much prescriptions as they are cautions.

The ultimate goal of US military support to an ally engaged in counter-revolution should be a politically and economically secure ally, independent of US support. This national goal suggests that the US military role be as limited as possible. It also suggests that the ultimate goal cannot be achieved by US forces; to retain its legitimacy, our ally must win its own counter-revolutionary battle. US forces can fill an interim military mission and provide ongoing training and other support, but they cannot win the war. Victory over a revolution comes from enduring teamwork and commitment.

What motivates people to change governments? The answer is self interest -- the opportunity to build a better life. That is why the Nicaraguans selected

communism over the dictatorship of the Somoza family; anyone can join the Communist Party of Nicaragua. That is why the Iranians selected the radical religious government they have today over the dictatorship of the Shah; anyone can join the church in Iran. Revolutions are invariably fought to improve status or standard of living. Capitalism provides an even more appealing and more proven way to improve the lot of peasants. Our role is to nudge developing nations along in the direction of democracy and capitalism.

Nation building is one long term solution to the problems that lead to revolution. Unless we insist on a balanced program to rebuild a healthy society, any investment we make will probably be wasted. We must be prepared to provide needed assistance in adequate amounts across the full social, military, economic, and political spectrum; and we must be prepared to demand results from our ally. If our ally does not have the determination to build a healthy nation, we need to look elsewhere for allies.

Revolutions begin because the government is unwilling or unable to meet the legitimate expectations of its people. The presence of an incipient revolution is evidence of the need for nation building. Victory will go to the side that wins the hearts and minds (and support) of the population. And, self interest is what motivates the

people. Without the support of the people, a revolution cannot survive. And when the revolution has the support of the population, the government cannot defeat it. The best it can do is retard the process.

Reversing a revolution after it is already in progress demands military action as well as nation building. The high technology, high destruction air weapons we have developed will be of little value in counter-revolution unless our ally can afford to procure and maintain them. Even then, these weapons may be of little value against a determined revolutionary force with cohesive ties to the population. We need to search for low technology and low firepower solutions to the doctrinal questions of counter-revolutionary war. Most of those questions have been articulated; our problem is to correctly marry the questions to each revolutionary situation. The strength of this marriage (i.e., how well the right questions are answered in each revolutionary situation) is the major measure of strategy in low intensity conflict. Unfortunately, we marched into both Korea and Viet Nam with a poor marriage and a poor understanding of the nature of those conflicts. Preventing such misadventures must become a cornerstone of our foreign policy if we are to be good allies in the low intensity, Third World arena.

The six tests outlined by Secretary of Defense Weinberger provide a fitting note of caution before

committing US forces to any combat, particularly counter-revolutionary war. He asserts that before entering into such a commitment, we ensure that vital US interests are at stake, that we are prepared to commit sufficient forces to win, that we have clearly defined political and military objectives, that we size our force to meet those objectives, that we have some reasonable assurance of support from the American public, and that US forces are committed only as a last resort (34:3-4.)

President Roosevelt delayed entering World War II from 1939 until 1941, building a consensus and waiting for the right moment to enter that war. In both Korea and Viet Nam, we committed forces to combat without a strong consensus or an understanding of the vital issues at stake. As Presidents Truman and Johnson discovered, the American public still has the last word (34:3-4.) It is fitting to close a paper on low intensity war with Secretary Weinberger's note of caution for it is in the low intensity environment where we face the greatest opportunity to repeat these mistakes.

APPENDIX A

TEN TESTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

War is the pursuit of policy by force. National strategy is the set of policies that guide the development of subordinate strategies for the attaining of national objectives whether by war or otherwise. One of the purposes of national strategy is to determine whether or when force is necessary in the pursuit of these objectives.

In contemplating the use of force, nations must consider that grand strategy, as well as military strategy, has a culminating point of victory. If the nation is so exhausted by the war effort that it is unable to maintain a satisfactory peace, the end to which the war was originally fought has been lost despite the outcome on the battlefield. Thus, the overwhelming bias in national strategy must be to avoid the use of force unless absolutely necessary. Stated another way, the purpose of national strategy must be to preserve the nation's strength as well as its interests.

In developing national strategy, leaders must recognize the limitations of war as a tool of policy and guard against leaving the seeds of antagonism that will cause the peace to fail. They must consider that the more

brutal the methods, the more bitter the enemy both during and following the war. The more unconditional and one-sided the terms of the peace, the stiffer the resistance to that peace. Finally, during peace, nations keep faith when they are compelled or when it is in their interests to do so. As a result of this, diplomats are inclined to negotiate an acceptable peace as soon as possible even if a decisive outcome on the battlefield is likely.

While the purpose of military strategy is to win the war, the purpose of national strategy must be to win the subsequent peace. This imposes constraints a general might not otherwise observe since some of the acts of war can make the subsequent peace harder or more expensive to attain and maintain. The purpose of this appendix is to describe ten yardsticks, in the form of questions, for testing the effectiveness and rationale of national strategy.

1. <u>What national interests or values are involved?</u> An even more important corollary is: How vital are these interests? It goes without saying that the public will not support the economic and moral fatigue of war without compelling reasons. These reasons must be understood and underwritten by the people before any sustained military effort is undertaken. Henry Kissinger warned against seeking (by force) conditions for which we are not prepared to fight indefinitely because it turns time into our

enemy's ally.

The Viet Nam war was a classic case of failing to identify the US national interests at stake. Historians still debate the precise reasons for this but most agree that a statement of national interests would not have had overwhelming popular support and in addition, the administration wanted to play down the war for domestic political reasons and declined to initiate a national discussion of the interests involved. Regardless of the reasons, in the absence of any effort to "sell" the war, the cost of war and then the war itself quickly became unpopular and then unwinnable (at the national strategy level.)

The example of Viet Nam suggests two more corollaries: How well does our nation understand our interests? And, how well does the world understand our interests? Without national understanding, we will lack national support. Without world understanding, we risk aggravating our allies and confirming the worst propaganda of our enemies. Our interests and the legitimacy of those interests must be spelled out in unequivocal terms before employing force.

2. <u>What are our national objectives?</u> What stable system (or satisfactory peace) are we seeking? Knowing the nature of the long term peace desired allows us to tailor the military objectives and political constraints to that end and improves the chances of negotiating a satisfactory

settlement at the least cost economically and militarily. Will the settlement be economically and politically viable? This is essential for lasting peace.

An equally important question for the strategist is: What are the threats to and vulnerabilities of the peace we are seeking? Without assessing what could go wrong and how to correct it (or whether it can be corrected), the strategist is choosing strategies based on emotion rather than reason.

Consider the thicket of issues involved in the Middle East. We are committed to maintaining friendly relations with the Arab states, maintaining an independent Israel, and ending Middle East based terrorism. Is this collection of national commitments compatible? The Middle East illustrates the final question we need to ask about objectives: are our objectives attainable? Many would argue that (at least in the Middle East) they are not.

3. Whom are we helping? What nation? What government? What segment of that nation's population does the government represent? Some of our greatest foreign policy disasters have occurred when governments we supported drifted further and further away from the needs of the nation's population. Our relationship with the Somoza government in Nicaragua and with the Shah in Iran are two recent examples of backing governments that had drifted away from the interests of their populations. In both cases

we attempted to intervene and push the government toward more popular positions, but in both cases it was too little too late.

What common interests and values do the two populations share? Common interests and values are the basis for stable peace and enduring agreements. History has shown that agreements, including peace agreements as well as alliances, are maintained only so long as the parties are compelled by force or by self interest to observe the terms of the agreements.

4. Whom are we opposing? What are their national interests? Are those interests legitimate in our eyes? In the eyes of the world? The degree of international support for our position will usually influence the degree of national support for our policy. If our opponent's interests are viewed as legitimate by most members of the international community, it will be difficult to muster international support for any major effort against the opponent.

Terrorism is an example of an issue in which the US has taken a more bellicose stance than most of the rest of the international community. While our interests are viewed as legitimate (and the terrorists' interests are not), the actions we have threatened have raised considerable international concern. While our interests are valid, our allies are reluctant to live with the results of our

actions.

Who makes decisions for our opponent and how can we influence those decisions? Knowing our opponent means knowing how he thinks and more importantly, how he reacts. The investment in understanding what will make our opponent agree to the stable peace we desire will offset tremendous military and economic investments elsewhere. In Viet Nam, we adopted a policy of gradualism without really considering that the North Vietnamese leaders were not interested in how poor their economic base was, only in ensuring that they could control their population. Gradualism taught them and their population that they could survive one day at a time. Contrast that with the North Vietnamese understanding of the US decision making process. Many major North Vietnamese decisions on how to conduct the 1968 Tet Offensive were made to enhance the television coverage of the offensive and to influence the Presidential campaign in America. It worked.

Are there divisive issues in our opponent's society or alliances that we could exploit? Just as the North Vietnamese exploited US public opinion, we need to determine and exploit those weaknesses we discover in our opponents.

A final, and often overlooked, question is: What interests do we share with our opponents? Common interests (with an opponent) are the basis for lasting peace and

lasting peace is the political situation we are working toward. Today, as we threaten Libya about their support of terrorism, we need to be examining the basis for a lasting peace with the Libyan people, and even with their current government.

5. Have we considered a full range of strategies, both direct and indirect? What influence do we have with the key actors? Can we achieve our objectives without use of force or with minimal use of force? How can we influence both our allies and our opponents? These are a few of the questions that must be answered to effectively tailor policy and doctrine to a specific situation. The more of these questions we can answer, the better we can avoid the chance of underkill or the damaging effects of overkill on the peace that follows.

What are our relative power advantages and disadvantages? How can we exploit the advantages and compensate for the disadvantages? What interests of our opponents can we put at risk? These are the keys to developing successful strategy. The essence of strategy is to attack an opponent's weakness with your strength. Yet the US has been slow to recognize its relative strengths and weaknesses, particularly in the regime of low intensity conflict. The US has consistently measured strength in absolute terms and concluded that it was vastly superior to that of Third World nations that opposed the US. In truth,

most US power is inappropriate for insurgency, and the advantages we do have are frequently offset by the surprise and secrecy advantages of insurgent groups. Thus, we must discipline ourselves to weigh only relevant sources of power -- only those that can be brought to bear in a given situation.

What covert or surrogate actions could we take? The advantage of covert or surrogate action is that it does not commit the prestige of the United States even though many observers may recognize that the US is involved. The spectrum of covert actions can range from moral support to intelligence collection to all forms of economic and military aid short of direct US involvement.

What diplomatic or economic strategies are available? How can we use our influence to achieve our objectives rather than expending economic and military capital in pursuit of goals by force? Military action is the most expensive way of achieving national goals and also the least likely to produce a lasting and satisfactory peace because of the antagonism it builds. Our current posture in the Middle East is an example of pursuing goals through diplomatic and economic policies. We have promoted diplomatic talks between Arab and Israeli negotiators where possible and have attempted to maintain a rough balance of power in that region through economic and military aid to Israel and selected Arab states.

What military actions are available? Appropriate? If it appears that military action is possible (or inevitable), what actions might we take and what constraints should we observe to make the subsequent peace easier to attain? These were questions that guided (and perhaps overcontrolled) our Viet Nam policy. In an effort to make peace easier to attain we risked an indecisive military strategy. This points out the danger inherent in viewing military options with an eye on only the subsequent peace. Before the peace can be pursued, the war must be won. The US may have committed unnecessarily large forces to the Grenada operation, but the military and political objectives were attained and the subsequent peace seems to be working.

6. <u>What will the strategy cost?</u> Viet Nam demonstrated that even a war against a fourth rate military power could be prohibitively expensive, politically and morally as well as economically. We must determine what economic costs are bearable for us and for our allies before military commitments are made. Even more than the economic costs of conducting the strategy, we need to look at the cost (and the impact) of losing on the subsequent peace.

Economic cost is difficult to predict but even more difficult is the political cost that may accrue. The cost of losing is particularly difficult to forecast. We can only speculate on whether our failure to keep South Viet

Nam independent had a significant effect on our foreign interests. Did it play a part in convincing the Iranians that our Embassy staff could be held hostage for over a year without risk of war? Has it made potential allies more hesitant to rely on us? These are questions without answers.

7. What are the limits of our national power? How much can we influence economically, diplomatically, militarily? While few would argue that the US is not a superpower, there are many situations where much of that power cannot be used. Indeed, there are many situations (particularly in dealing with the Third World) where that power is a liability. Resisting the US is a matter of national pride in some areas.

What is the most advantageous outcome we could achieve without force? With force? If force is necessary, how can it be most effectively applied? These are some of the questions that we must ask to tailor the strategy to the situation. After determining a course of action, we need to ask: How can we tailor this strategy to make it more acceptable to our allies? To the world at large? To our opponents? The more reasonable our objectives and strategy, the quicker and more acceptable the settlement.

8. What could go wrong? This is perhaps the most important question a strategist can ask. The Bay of Pigs decision was an example of not challenging a proposal even

though many in the Kennedy Administration had serious doubts about the invasion. The term "groupthink" was coined to describe the process that suppressed those doubts. The changes Kennedy introduced to correct the problem were aimed at forcing the "What could go wrong?" questions to be asked.

What will indicate it is time to change strategy? At some point even the best strategy will have to be modified to be successful. The prevailing wisdom in Rome was that Hannibal would have to be directly confronted and defeated to force him back to Carthage; yet a succession of Roman generals were unable to do that for more than fifteen years. It was not until Scipio changed the strategy that the Romans were able to prevail. The strategist must look at sources of power for both sides and detect trends that make old objectives unattainable or old methods unnecessary and adjust strategy accordingly.

What are the direct and indirect consequences of a particular decision or policy? Many in the Nixon Administration foresaw the likelihood of the fall of South Viet Nam after our decision to withdraw from that country. It was even easier to foresee after withdrawal of most of the material aid we had been providing. But few anticipated (and nobody can really judge) the impact of the loss of international prestige on our relations elsewhere in the world. Would the Iranians have so readily held our Embassy

people hostage? Would international terrorists consider Americans such a safe target? There is no agreement about the impact of the way we terminated our support of the South Vietnamese government, but it undoubtedly reinforced the impresssion in many minds around the world that the US was unwilling to back up words with deeds.

Who has played "Devil's Advocate" for (or against) our strategy and what does that person think? President Kennedy began appointing a Devil's Advocate after the Bay of Pigs. The Air Force CHECKMATE office performs a similar function in helping us to anticipate what the Soviet Union might do. The search for weaknesses and subsequent corrective actions are what build a strong strategy from an average strategy.

9. <u>How can we mobilize support for our strategy?</u> How can we establish a favorable psychological environment at home? Internationally? In our ally's society? In our opponent's society? In World War II, President Roosevelt kept the US out of the war until the attack on Pearl Harbor triggered massive popular support for the war. In Viet Nam, President Johnson's desire to pursue both the war and the "Great Society" social programs led to a policy of deemphasizing the war that forfeited the psychological battlefield to the North Vietnamese. That the North Vietnamese were able to garner international support for what was demonstrably a brutal, totalitarian government shows the importance of establishing a favorable

psychological environment internationally. Their exploitation of the US media, particularly during the 1968 Tet Offensive, attests to the importance of establishing a favorable psychological environment in one's opponent's society.

In addition to the intensity of support on the home front, we need to develop public and private postures wherever possible that will increase the number of our own allies and reduce the number of our opponents allies. Current debates on international terrorism demonstrate this process. Until the recent attack on Libya, the US has been reluctant to take any precipitous military action against known terrorist sanctuaries because of the reluctance of our allies to support such a policy and the possible loss of allies should we take such action unilaterally.

10. Who must understand this strategy for it to succeed? The strategist must weigh security against the need to disseminate a strategy and strike a balance. The Grenada incursion suffered some operational difficulties because the need for operational security and the benefits of surprise outweighed the value of more extensive dissemination and the higher likelihood of warning leaking to communist forces on Grenada.

The other side of that question is how much information needs to be disseminated and when? Support for any strategy will quickly wither if the public is not kept

informed. Similarly, allies will cease to be active supporters if they are not kept informed. For quick actions like Grenada, some secrecy is acceptable, but for long term commitments, like our involvement in Lebanon, public and international support must be cultivated without compromising secrecy and surprise.

This has been a short description of some of the key questions pertinent to developing and implementing a national strategy. Its purpose was to provide yardsticks for evaluating national strategies for conflict or confrontation involving possible use of military force.

APPENDIX B

TEN TESTS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The essence of military strategy is to threaten -- to put at risk -- vital assets that the enemy had presumed secure. This forces on that enemy a new, less mature strategy which will, in turn, be even easier to dislocate and defeat. The purpose of military strategy must be to prevail by force in a manner that does not compromise the peace being sought.

Strategy springs from the marriage of doctrine (or beliefs) to a situation. In Viet Nam, we were unable to present political leaders with a persuasive military strategy that matched their political objectives. We were left with a military strategy designed by politicians rather than professionals. Our inability to present a persuasive strategy married to the political objectives was, in part, due to the absence of doctrine on how to combat insurgency, but it was also due in part to our own tendency to present military strategy unconstrained by the political realities of insurgency. By ignoring political objectives and constraints, we compromised our position as experts.

The purpose of this appendix is to explore critical

questions in both military strategy and the process of creating that strategy and to develop some guidelines for strategists to use in creating effective strategy.

1. What is our national strategy? What political goals are we seeking? Without a clear understanding of the political objectives, military effort is just an exercise in destruction. To loyally prosecute a military campaign, the general must attain the political objective without compromising the peace political leaders seek. The other side of the political objective is the political constraint; we must not violate these constraints either.

In Korea, Gen MacArthur's military strategy was working, yet he was replaced for ignoring (and criticizing) policy. His strategy was fine in a purely military sense but it failed the test of meeting national political objectives. His public criticism created political stresses in the US that made continued political support of the war difficult.

Who can best convert national strategy into military strategy? The obvious answer is the accountable field commander, but whom should that commander gather to develop the strategy? Should the State Department be part of the planning team? Should the CIA? Should there be any allied planners involved? On whom will that commander depend for successful execution of the plan. The standard military joint staff is equipped to handle most contingencies, but

not all. The commander needs to consider what outside resources he will need to develop an executable plan.

Whose war are we fighting? Too often, the military assumes it is their war when, in reality, it is the politician's war. This is particularly true of the low intensity wars that have been fought since WW II. We could help the South Vietnamese avoid defeat, but we could never have won the war for them. That is something the South Vietnamese government would have had to do eventually if it was to retain its legitimacy.

2. Who are our allies? More importantly, what are their capabilities and how are responsibilities allocated? The most frequent type of military engagement since WW II has been US support to an ally combatting an insurgent uprising. Most of the important actions needed to counter an insurgency cannot be accomplished by an external power regardless of relative military strength. In contrast, there are some things that we alone can do, primarily in the areas of applied technology.

How are we allied? What are the command relationships? How will we share intelligence? The mechanisms of alliance affect the way the strategy will be conducted after it is developed and thus, affect the strategy.

How allied are we? Strategy is built on assumptions. In WW II, issues were black and white and allies were easy to assess. Today, political controversy divides many

nations on all but the most fundamental survival issues. Recent hesitance by US allies over military responses to terrorism and NATO nations waffling on deployment of intermediate cruise missiles are two examples of allies not in consensus with the US. The depth of allied commitment is difficult to judge but judging it is essential in planning and executing a strategy.

3. Who is our enemy? Who are his allies and sympathizers and what military capabilities are they going to contribute? This is the first and most important part of threat assessment. Without knowing who all the enemies are, you can't know what assets are critical enough to be decisive. Without knowing which targets will be decisive, you don't have a strategy. In Korea, we misjudged the intentions of the Chinese and their counterattack caught us off guard and prolonged that crisis. We can never be sure what an ally or sympathizer will do, but we need to incorporate contingency plans for any likely escalation of a confrontation.

Who are our enemy's political and military leaders? How do they think? Are they predictable? Assessing the motivations and past behavior of Ho Chi Minh might have convinced US politicians that microescalation and graduated response wouldn't work. Ho was a nationalist committed to unification of Viet Nam under his communist rule. He had dedicated his life to that objective and seemed to have

little interest in material well being or in saving lives. Microescalation demonstrated the ability to interdict at will but not the will to interdict. Not until Linebacker II when we showed the ability, and more importantly the resolve, to seriously damage the North Vietnamese economy, did they take US military might seriously -- and that was after Ho's death.

What strategy will the enemy employ? Which of our target networks will they attack and how? Based on the capabilities and the leadership, we have to be prepared to counter the most likely enemy moves while retaining the flexibility to counter any number of contingencies.

4. <u>What are our military objectives?</u> What target networks are so important that their loss would decisively cripple the enemy? To a considerable degree, military objectives will be driven by political objectives. National leaders looking toward the following peace will be inclined to limit destruction as much as possible to avoid alienating the enemy population and make a safer peace more likely. The risk this strategy runs is that it will lead to stalemate rather than victory. Military leaders must ensure that our civilian leaders understand the risks of force constraints in terms of prolonging the conflict and the effect of prolonged fighting on both casualty rates and on the peace that follows.

Decisive target networks include not just military

facilities, but economic, social, and political networks as well. And decisive weapons need not rely on firepower alone. This can satisfy the politicians desire to limit direct use of force. The goal of strategy is to so weaken an opponent before fighting that he is unable to withstand further and capitulates without use of force. Frequently economic and social measures can either accomplish this or greatly reduce the amount of military force when it is required.

How are each of these decisive target networks vulnerable? In the North African campaign in WW II, ground commanders insisted on close air support and defensive counterair overhead while German aircraft were attacking. The allies did not defeat the Germans until air commanders sold the idea of offensive counterair attacks on the German Air Force while it was on the ground. Within weeks after this shift in strategy, the allies had overwhelming control of the air and the Germans were on the defensive. The German Air Force was vulnerable on the ground; it was not in the air.

Target networks need not be military to be decisive. Rolling Thunder was indecisive because the rules of engagement limited the targets to those that were not, by nature, decisive. Linebacker II attacked the heart of North Vietnamese economic infrastructure and the ports through which its allies were supplying it. These were decisive

targets and the political objective, a negotiated settlement, was achieved quickly (and almost as quickly abrogated.)

What are our military priorities and how can we quickly achieve them? Assuming we have done all we can (short of fighting) to weaken the enemy, the highest priority military target networks should be those that most weaken his forces or will even further. It may be his economic infrastructure; it may be his POL sources; it may be a psychological campaign to weaken the will of his forces. After determining what the targets are, sufficient force must be concentrated to achieve that objective before the enemy can recover and defend those targets. In Linebacker II, the North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile supply was exhausted, leaving it with no defense against US bombers. With its defenses weakened to the point of being nonexistent, North Viet Nam had no choice but to agree to a peace accord.

5. <u>How are we vulnerable?</u> What are we doing about it? Understanding our own vulnerabilities is at least as important as understanding our enemy's. If we cannot protect our forces, we will have a difficult time siezing and maintaining the initiative. More importantly, if our economic or social base is threatened, our society will not be able to concentrate on the war effort. North Viet Nam, unable to mount a decisive effort in any other arena,

successfully attacked US will in defending South Viet Nam. The Sandinista government in Nicaragua is attempting (in Congress and the media) to attack US will to support Contra rebels in Nicaragua. They have been successful in limiting US support but not in ending it.

How secure are our lines of communication and our logistic support capabilities? The capacity of the logistic pipeline determines, or limits, the rate at which we can advance or or amounts we can expend in employing our forces. If the enemy can interdict our lines of communication or curtail logistic support activity, he can greatly curtail our military operations.

How solid is the home front? Can it be targetted as it was during Viet Nam? How aggressively is civilian leadership trying to capture national support for the conflict? One of the lessons of the post WW II era is that in the absence of all-out war to rally the country around, considerable political capital must be spent to rally support. If the civilian leadership isn't selling, morale in the ranks is going to suffer and political constraints may be excessive. If the war isn't popular at home, it won't be popular with the troops (all of whom came from home and must return there.)

What is the enemy's perception of our strengths and weaknesses? This is one of the keys to determining enemy intentions and likely targets. The fall of South Viet Nam

severely damaged US prestige around the world. It is probably not coincidence alone that has been responsible for the Iranian hostage taking and the targeting of Americans by terrorists. Some credit can also go to the reduced perception of US capability and the perception that the US was reluctant to employ force for fear of getting involved in another Viet Nam.

6. How can we dislocate the enemy's strategy? Where and how has he defended his critical resources and how might we attack them? Dislocation of his strategy introduces confusion and often disagreement into enemy planning. Effective dislocation almost guarantees the initiative until the enemy recovers, develops, and disseminates a new strategy. Dislocation has been a critical element of military campaigns throughout history. Hitler's blitzkrieg strategy is a classic demonstration of decisive dislocation. The speed, intensity of firepower, and integrated airpower presented a military force other European nations hadn't reckoned on and were not prepared to defend against. As his Panzer divisions swept across borders, the defending nations were so dislocated that they were unable to develop new strategies in time to affect the outcome. Blitzkrieg dislocated the defender's strategy and so weakened the command, control, and morale that victory was accomplished quickly and with very few losses.

How can we tie down the enemy's forces with maneuver

or deception inducing him to defend too many of the wrong assets? Deception is the cornerstone of dislocation. Not only does an effective deception campaign leave the enemy vulnerable, but exploiting that vulnerability, in turn, damages the enemy's confidence and can slow or paralyze decision making. Weakening the enemy's confidence can have another beneficial side effect in that it generally makes the enemy more cautious and predictable.

7. <u>What forces do we have?</u> How many and what kind of forces do we have relative to the enemy? Do we have the right mix of forces to effectively attack the enemy's most important target networks? In some cases, we may have superior forces in absolute terms, but be unable to effectively employ them against the enemy. Viet Nam presents a classic example. The nature of guerrilla war is to keep forces spread out throughout the populace to prevent forming lucrative military targets, thus our dependence on firepower was a disadvantage. At the same time, North Vietnamese forces remained in the relative sanctuaries we granted in Laos, Cambodia, and North Viet Nam. Thus despite superior firepower, we were unable to effectively employ that firepower to defeat the enemy. Having the right type of force is growing in importance since Viet Nam and Afghanistan because smaller countries have realized that under some circumstances they can neutralize superior firepower and actually challenge the

superpowers.

How fast, and at what cost, can we win a war of attrition? Attrition is the simplest strategy and the strategy the US has most often followed. It is a strategy of weakening the enemy by frontal assault prior to the decisive battle. It is a high cost strategy but effective for the US because of its economic power. The ability to win a war of attrition puts the burden of assuming a riskier strategy on the enemy.

How cohesive are the forces and the command structure that controls them? US forces alone would have relatively high cohesion and few problems with the mechanics of command and control. US forces fighting alone is an unlikely scenario though. The most likely places for US forces to be employed are in an allied country with whom we do not have a standing military command structure agreement. Even in NATO where the command agreements have remained relatively stable since the alliance was formed, language barriers, doctrinal differences, and the separation of the operations and logistics command lines present formidable cohesion problems for the US and its allies.

8. <u>What intelligence do we have?</u> What intelligence do we need? How can we get it. The US has probably the preeminent high technology intelligence gathering capability in the world but many of the operations we will

need to conduct will depend on human intelligence and that, in turn, depends on networks of agents. Will we have enough of them and in the right places?

How timely is the collection and dissemination of intelligence? As the speed of weapon systems increases and the ability to change frequencies rapidly improves, the value of signal intelligence drops off quickly. Can we get the electronic order of battle out to our forces in time for it to be useful?

What intelligence is the enemy collecting? Can we deceive him? Knowing what the enemy is collecting lets us anticipate his moves and gives us other clues about his force structure and disposition. It also presents opportunities for tactical deception to weaken his forces where we intend to attack. The prelude to the Tet Offensive in Viet Nam included several tactical deception thrusts. The North Vietnamese declared a cease fire to draw down the alert state of US and South Vietnamese forces. Knowing that the movement of logistics into South Viet Nam would not go unnoticed, they leaked false information to the effect that the offensive would start sometime after Tet and would be concentrated along the Cambodian border. They coupled this military deception with a psychological deception campaign aimed at convincing the South Vietnamese people that the US was soon dropping its support of the existing South Vietnamese government. Effective intelligence prevented any

of these campaigns from succeeding and the communist forces achieved no significant advantage from the deception programs.

9. How good is our combat support system? What are the limits or bottlenecks in our production, transportation, and storage systems? These bottlenecks limit the rate at which we can advance and expend ammunition. Eisenhower slowed the allied advance across France in WW II because his armies were outrunning the logistic system and he was concerned about the possibility of a German counterattack against forces running low on POL and ammunition.

Where is our logistic system most vulnerable? If the enemy intelligence system is effective, the bottlenecks are targets he is likely to attack. How can we protect those elements that are vulnerable? Can they be hardened or dispersed? Do we nave enough redundancy? Can ground forces protect our facilities from enemy agents or advance forces?

How responsive is the support system to changes? Can we redirect supplies and people? How quickly? We cannot anticipate every enemy move; therefore, we must be able to shore up our defenses and take advantage of battlefield opportunities. That means diverting forces and their associated logistic tails.

10. Who must understand the strategy for it to succeed? The obvious answer is that subordinate commanders must understand it but there are others in the community of

interest as well. The political leaders must understand the strategy and be able to support it with Congress and, if necessary, with the public. In most cases we will have allies that must also understand the strategy, even if it employs only US units.

What is the OPSEC penalty we pay for allowing each additional person in on the strategy? With each additional person, the probability of leaking some aspect of the strategy grows incrementally. Delaying notification of each person until absolutely necessary limits exposure but also inhibits understanding of the plan. The decision on whom to notify and when falls to the responsible commander. Broad dissemination of the plans for Grenada was not done to protect the existence of the plans. The few Cuban troops on Grenada could have, with advance warning, dug in and presented a difficult tactical problem and caused more casualties. In addition, given sufficient time, Cuban forces could have brought in hand held infrared missiles to attack troop carrying and resupply aircraft. The extensive criticism for lack of coordination of US forces in the press is probably more than offset by the minimal number of casualties in the invasion.

These have been a collection of some of the questions a joint/combined commander needs to ask himself. They provide a quick reminder to all of us about the push and tug of competing needs in developing strategy. In addition,

they provide a guide for assessing those strategies we are following both for proposing better strategies and for compensating for the weaknesses that exist in any strategy.

APPENDIX C

TEN TESTS OF AIR STRATEGY

What are the elements critical to success of air campaigns? Why was Rolling Thunder indecisive and what should air commanders have done differently? What factors contributed to the decisive Israeli air domination over the Bekaa valley? The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the elements of strategy necessary for success in an air campaign. In many cases, the air campaign will be shaped by national strategy and by the overall military strategy but the air commander needs to examine the ensuing questions to develop the insight and rationale for both executing and changing higher level strategy.

1. What is our military strategy? What are our military and political objectives? The political objective of graduated response was vehemently disputed by air commanders in Viet Nam as an unsound military tactic, which it was. The political objective of inducing North Viet Nam to stop its support of the Viet Cong insurgency by demonstrating our ability to strike at will and at the same time, our restraint from doing so, violated the Clausewitzian concept of decisive victory. Yet, since we failed to counter with any politically acceptable and

persuasive alternative strategy, we were overruled and the military targets and rules of engagement were dominated by civilian planners rather than military staffs. Part of the fault lies with civilian planners who tried to conduct a war while appearing to be peacemakers but some of the fault must also lie with the generals who did not embrace the political objectives of the war as dearly as they could have.

What are the political constraints? In Viet Nam they seemed onerous. In most future wars they will likely be just as onerous since the most likely conflicts will not be the all out, national survival war that promotes liberal rules of engagement. Instead of a tidy black and white, good guys and bad guys war, we will be fighting gray wars with limited objectives where overreliance on firepower can antagonize the population and defeat the political objective regardless of the military outcome.

What are the allied and national command structures? They can be radically different and can have major impacts on the way we do business. In NATO, we have an integrated operational command structure with national command channels handling administration and support. In Viet Nam, there were two separate chains of command, one for the US and one for the Republic of Viet Nam. Any organization can be made to work, but they all work differently and figuring out how is an essential prelude to successful air

operations.

2. How can airpower best support our strategy? This is often the key question for an air commander to ask. The other commanders in the joint command structure will probably rely on and compete for air based on classic air missions and routine air tactics and applications. Fully exploiting the flexibility of air will demand that the air commander force the best fit between air doctrine and the real situation, both politically and militarily.

What can air alone do? There are a number of functions, such as airlift and reconnaisance, that other services are not equipped to perform. Ground forces are dependent on air for support in these areas. What are the requirements in these areas and what air assets will we need to perform them in both surge and steady state conditions?

How can air be decisive? What centers of gravity can air attack and defeat so thoroughly that the enemy will lose the will to fight? Can we demoralize his forces/population? Can we paralyze his economy? His logistics network?

How can air best support surface operations? Against another major air power, defeating the enemy's air forces must be a high priority. In addition to that, how can we best weaken the enemy's ground forces? Will an interdiction campaign work? Or would close air support be more

effective? In North Africa, the allies failed to break the German forces until after the allied air commander had forced a shift in strategy from close air support to offensive counter air. Air commanders are the only people in a position to assess the relative air power we can bring to bear on the enemy and what effect that airpower can have.

How are we organized to support our air strategy? Do we have an allied or US command structure? Are all major commands with committed forces represented at the air command post? Supporting functions, such as Airlift, Aeromedical Evacuation, Special Operations, etc. must be part of the planning process; they must know what the main forces are doing to best plan their supporting operations. How responsive is the air command structure? Can it reallocate and retask quickly, or does a change in target cause unacceptable delays?

3. <u>How will we gain, maintain, and exploit control of the air</u>? This is one of the fundamental questions an air commander must assess. The air commander in North Africa believed, and demonstrated, that offensive counter air -- destroying the enemy's airpower on the ground -- was the most effective approach in that campaign. Air commanders in future wars must be able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of enemy air and determine the most advantageous strategy for pursuing the war for the skies over the

battlefield.

Along the way, the air commander must determine what the threats to airpower are. Does the enemy have an effective SAM network? Do they have comparable air superiority fighters? In sufficient numbers? Do they have RADAR and other sensors to provide early warning? Do they have a network of agents that can sabotage air operations? Are our people, aircraft, and bases secure? How can these threats be most effectively neutralized? The air environment over Viet Nam allowed us to strike with relative impunity throughout Southeast Asia. The air environment in Central Europe will not be as favorable.

Where are our qualitative advantages? What force structure will we need to quickly exploit these advantages and achieve control of the air? These issues need to be asked regularly and force mix adjusted to the new situation. The entry of Communist China into the Korean war changed the nature of the air war by introducing jet vs. jet air-to-air combat, but most qualitative changes are much less obvious. The air commander must watch not only technological change, but also changes in strategy and tactics and adjust his own employment concepts accordingly. The quicker he can adapt, the less advantage the enemy can draw from the change.

What will indicate we are succeeding? Determining what indicators to watch is a sensitive task. Like strategy,

these indicators must be reviewed regularly.[4] The introduction of new systems, like the EF-111, can shift the balance of force but without knowing how much benefit accrues, it is difficult to know how much to invest in EF-111s versus attack planes. There is no common set of indicators and during the course of an involvement, the appropriate set of indicators may change. In a high threat environment, defense suppression systems are indispensable; in a low threat environment, they have nothing to suppress. In many cases, the best indicators reveal themselves progressively; the most effective air commander is the one that recognizes the need for change and has the courage and insight to adapt strategy for the better. General Lemay's shift from high altitude bombing to low altitude bombing in the Pacific was just such a change in strategy based on indicators that the high altitude strategy wasn't working. It involved reversing the bombing strategy he had developed for Europe, but he recognized the dynamics of the new environment and the need for more accuracy -- and he adapted.

4. <u>How are we seizing and maintaining the initiative</u>? Are we forcing the enemy to react rather than initiate? What does he react to and how fast? This set of questions is closely related to those about air superiority but they apply to the entire air campaign, including offensive air support and interdiction. The keys to seizing and

maintaining the initiative are the intelligence network and the command and control network the air commander has at his disposal and how well they interface with his operational planning. Can we detect opportunities and apply airpower in time to exploit them? In addition, are we employing surprise to keep the enemy off balance? Do we vary our tactics to avoid predictability?

Are we maintaining a timing and tempo the enemy cannot effectively react to? Keeping the enemy off balance demands not just one surprise, but frequent attacks that disrupt his planning and preclude effective counterattack. Linebacker II was effective not because of surprise so much as because of saturation of the enemy SAM capability. By the end of the campaign, the North Vietnamese were out of SAMs and virtually defenseless. They had no choice but to agree to a peace accord -- and no qualms about abrogating it later.

Are we preventing the enemy from massing for an attack on our ground forces. In an intense campaign against a sophisticated and dense logistics system such as the Warsaw Pact, it is unrealistic to assume we could completely interdict supplies reaching the battlefield, but disrupting the massing of forces or the coordination of an attack may be sufficient to achieve NATO's defensive objectives. On the other hand, allowing a Warsaw Pact breakthrough could completely disrupt our air campaign because a breakthrough

would put Warsaw Pact ground forces in close proximity to most of our Central Region air assets.

What battlefield opportunities might emerge? The key to exploiting battlefield opportunities is being prepared to exploit them, and anticipating is the key to preparation. Blitzkrieg tactics were so successful early in World War II not so much because of the superior firepower tactical air provided, but rather, because the German commanders anticipated the confusion and disorganization that would result from the blitzkrieg and were prepared to exploit opportunities as they emerged.

5. How will we carry the fight to the enemy? Are we attacking his most critical assets at ther most vulnerable points? The object of war is not to attack the enemy's strength; it is to attack his weaknesses. Attacking where he is prepared is attacking his strength since he will have hardened, dispersed, or camouflaged his assets and will have his defensive systems deployed to do the greatest damage to attacking forces. The intelligence system must find those places in the enemy's critical assets that are not well defended and the routes to those targets that will delay detection the most effectively. Then the air commander must exploit those weaknesses.

Are we building employment packages that include CAP and SEAD as well as the attack forces? In a high threat environment, launching an attack force without the

defensive systems that will allow that package to reach its target is a waste of air assets. How much CAP and how much SEAD to apply is a judgement call by the commander. Since both of those assets are limited, the choice may become which missions must we conduct and which may be delayed until more CAP and SEAD is available or until enemy threats have been reduced. The other side of that question is: Which targets are so valuable that they must be attacked regardless of the cost in aircraft losses?

Given the state of aircrew training and preparation, how much force is enough to penetrate the enemy defenses and still gain local superiority over the battlefield? How many attack aircraft are needed over the target to destroy it? How many air-to-air fighters are needed to keep enemy air away from the attack force over the target? What defense suppression forces are needed over the target to free the attack aircraft to concentrate on the primary target? Can economies of scale be achieved by launching attack packages against multiple targets down the same defense suppression penetration corridor?

Are we spending air assets effectively (including airlift, reconnaisance, etc.)? What losses to each force will be sustained enroute? What are acceptable losses given the value of the target? Optimizing individual mission survival is almost always suboptimal from the standpoint of the war effort. Do individual units understand that only

the senior commanders are in a position to assess the value of missions or will high loss rates be interpreted as a sign of ineptitude with the associated loss of confidence and cohesion?

6. Have we established reliable and responsive command, control, and communications and intelligence networks? Are joint and allied networks interconnected? Are specialized networks (such as airlift, reconnaisance, and air rescue) integrated into the same network? Without this integration, unity of command becomes much more difficult and demands far more of the senior commander's time, crowding out important strategic issues. In most prospective world trouble spots, we do not have well developed command structures (or agreements for command structures.) The result is that command arrangements will have to be developed on the fly and unity of command (or lack thereof) may become the most important obstacle to success.

Are operations, support, and intelligence effectively linked? Are the links redundant? If the functions are not linked, the system will act in a disjointed fashion that can undercut even the best strategy. If the bombs show up at the F-15 base and the air-to-air missiles show up at the A-10 base, the strategy won't work. More to the point, battlefield opportunities decay with time. Delays in reacting to opportunities and in supporting the operations

needed to exploit those opportunities reduce the value of targets once they are engaged. The most obvious failing of most command and control systems is breakdown in communications between the operations and the intelligence communities. Unless the air commander watches and cares about this interface, it can become a negative force multiplier.

How are the various subnetworks vital to the air war linked? Are the offensive and defensive air wars linked under a single commander? The separation of friendly and enemy aircraft in a high threat, multiple bogie, environment like the European scenario, demands tight coordination of offensive air plans with the defensive forces to avoid fratricide. Is there a single manager for air defense and airspace control? Airspace control would seem to be an air commander's responsibility, but surface-to-air missiles are an Army responsibility. Developing the wartime rules of engagement and safe passage airspace procedures is a difficult task that must be done carefully and disseminated thoroughly to provide safe passage to friendly aircraft while defending friendly bases and facilities in the rear area.

How survivable is the command structure? Are the facilities hardened? Are the communications secure and redundant? Are there reconstitution plans and an established succession of command? The test of a command

system is not how it works in an unstressed environment, but how it works in a crisis or when parts of the system break down. Is the degradation graceful or catastrophic? If it is catastrophic, how fast can we reestablish command and control?

7. What intelligence do we need? How can we collect what we do not already have? Intelligence is fundamental to the execution of any military strategy. Air strategy is even more dependent on intelligence because of dependence on multiple sourec intelligence for threats as well as targetting. Because of the flexibility and responsiveness of air, the intelligence flow is going to drive much of the tasking of air. If the intelligence is accurate, air can be effective. If the intelligence is not accurate or not timely, we will spend our air assets less effectively.

Each weapon we have needs certain pieces of intelligence to be used properly. Similarly, each target has unique vulnerabilities and geographic attack axes. The better the marriage of intelligence, weapon system, and target, the more effective the air strategy will be.

How do we collect? Analyze? Disseminate? How could we do it better? Faster? Most of our intelligence in a high threat environment will come from signal intelligence; and, we are fielding a variety of platforms to improve our capabilities. How well we tie those intelligence platforms to the operational systems they support will determine the

value of the intelligence they provide. In Europe, the intelligence infrastructure to counter a Warsaw Pact invasion is in place and evolving. In the Persian Gulf, that infrastructure would have to be developed.

In a low threat environment, the most useful intelligence will be human intelligence which has no tidy technological fix. It takes years to develop networks of agents. In all likelihood, if a low intensity war breaks out and the side we support doesn't have productive networks of agents, we will have to make do with whatever is available. Despite the differences, the same fundamental questions apply. How can we collect it better, analyze it more thoroughly, and disseminate it more quickly?

8. Are we exploiting the psychological impact of airpower? In some respects, the psychological impact of airpower is opposite to that intended. The bombing of North Viet Nam strengthened rather than weakened North Vietnamese resolve to continue the war. The bombing of British cities during World War II seemed to have the same effect; it stiffened British resolve. Nevertheless, airpower can have a significant psychological effect; in particular, it can shorten a war after the outcome is determined by convincing the opposition that further resistance is fruitless. More important are the ways in which it can influence the outcome of the war.

What command and control networks can we disrupt?

Disruption of the enemy's command and control system can dislocate his strategy and render him ineffective. That is particularly true of armies that rely heavily on strong centralized control like those of the Warsaw Pact and less true of the guerrilla armies found in the Third World. The dividends from disrupting the command and control system can be far reaching since they cam reduce confidence in command decision making and responsiveness.

What tactical deception campaigns could we conduct? Another potential psychological impact of air is to deceive the enemy into an inappropriate strategy. Again, the immediate benefits of deception are often worth the investment, but the long term effects may be even more valuable. Loss of confidence in one's ability to react to an opponent usually leads to a more cautious and predictable strategy; and a more cautious and predictable strategy provides even more opportunities for exploitation.

9. <u>What could go wrong</u>? How could the strategy fail and what would indicate that it is failing? High altitude bombing wasn't working for General LeMay. He had a multitude of statistics that could have been interpreted in a number of ways. Most people who had championed the concept of high altitude bombing, as he had, would have interpreted those statistics in a manner that reinforced their beliefs. General LeMay realized that regardless of the statistics that indicated success, Japanese industry

was reconstituting itself after the bombing missions and industrial output was only marginally diminished. So he changed his strategy and the Japanese war machine began to collapse. Most strategies do not have to be reversed so drastically but a strategy that remains static will gradually lose its effectiveness as the enemy adapts. Therefore, the air commander must be prepared to continue to refine and adapt even the soundest of strategies.

Do we have contingency plans for lost communications? If there is no fallback plan for employing airpower after either the communications system is interrupted or the command center is destroyed, air assets become a deployed target set rather than a weapon system. The military was criticized in the press because an officer during the Grenada invasion had to use a public telephone and his telephone credit card number to place a call to his headquarters. While that may indeed be an indicator that we didn't bring enough of the right kind of communications equipment to Grenada, I think it is an affirmation that we brought the right kind of officer to Grenada. He had thought through the lost communications contingency and was able to improvise a plan that worked. Many of our communications networks in Europe are vulnerable during a Warsaw Pact invasion. Hopefully, our commanders there will have thought through the multitude of options for lost communications and have a game plan for coping.

How will we cope with lost airfields? Most of our units train for specified airfields. More importantly, most of our infrastructure planning (logistics, intelligence, communications, etc) is based on assumptions about which types of aircraft are going where. Are our systems and our strategies flexible enough to quickly cope with changes in the lineup of which aircraft are going where?

Will our strategy survive minor errors of execution? War is complex and complex systems have more opportunities for delays or minor breakdowns than simple systems. A strategy that relies on perfection for success has failed before it starts; it must be able to absorb some errors in execution and some enemy surprises without suffering catastrophic breakdown.

What could our opponents do to upset our strategy? Or looking at the same question from a different perspective, what would disrupt our strategy if our opponents could do it? Thinking through the failure modes of our strategy allows the commander to recognize adverse trends more quickly and adapt strategy to reduce the impact of enemy countermoves.

10. <u>Who needs to understand the strategy for it to work</u>? Air strategy must be disseminated to be useful, but if too widely disseminated, it can be compromised. Once compromised, the enemy will begin countering the strategy, driving down the effectiveness and driving up the cost,

financially and in lives. Subordinate commanders and other key personnel at unit level must be aware of those portions of the strategy that they must execute. More importantly, they must be aware of related parts of the strategy -- of operations they support or those that support them.

Which joint and allied commanders must understand the stategy? Again those that must support it should understand it. How widely they disseminate it among their staffs is determined by how important secrecy is. OPSEC demands that as few people as possible have access to war plans, but effective execution demands that as many as possible understand as much as possible about those plans. Depending on the surprise needed for execution, the commander must develop dissemination and security practices appropriate for his mission

The final question the commander must assure himself of is: do those who must understand the strategy truly understand it? Disseminating a strategy does not automatically create understanding. The commander must test those of his subordinates charged with execution to ensure that they truly understand his stategy and the philosophy underlying it. Only then does strategy begin to build the cohesion that leads to success.

The art of being an air commander entails balancing the often competing demands associated with these questions and identifying which questions are the critical ones for

the situation he is in. The great commanders have been equal to the task. Those who would aspire to being an air commander must steep themselves in history and doctrine to better prepare for the day when they will have to decide which issues must dominate the development and execution of air strategy.

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